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Abstract
We study how signaling affects equilibrium outcomes and welfare in markets with adverse
selection. Using data from an online credit market, we estimate a model of borrowers and
lenders where low reserve interest rates can signal low default risk. Comparing a market with
and without signaling relative to the benchmark case with no asymmetric information, we find
that adverse selection destroys as much as 16% of total surplus, up to 95% of which can be
restored with signaling. We also find the credit supply curves to be backward-bending for some
markets, consistent with the prediction of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
JEL Code: D82, D83, G21, L15
KEYWORDS: Signaling, adverse selection, structural estimation
1 Introduction
Inefficiencies arising from adverse selection is a key feature in many markets, with examples rang-
ing from “lemons” in used car markets (Akerlof, 1970) to toxic assets in financial markets (Morris
and Shin, 2012). An important source of inefficiency in these markets lies in the inability of agents
who are of “good” types (e.g., sellers of high–quality cars) to distinguish themselves from the
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“bad” (e.g., sellers of low–quality cars), resulting in markets to unravel completely in the worst–
case scenario. The key insight of Spence (1973), however, is that when costly signaling devices are
available, agents who have different marginal cost of signaling can be induced to take action that
reveals their true type in equilibrium. Hence signaling can prevent the market from unraveling,
with possibly large welfare implications.
Recently, there is a growing empirical literature in industrial organization that studies the effect
of adverse selection on market outcomes and welfare.1 In this paper, we ask the natural next ques-
tion, how signaling affects equilibrium outcomes and welfare in markets with adverse selection.
While the theory of signaling has been applied to a wide range of topics in industrial organiza-
tion, there is very little empirical work that quantifies the extent to which signaling affects market
outcomes and welfare relative to a market with no signaling (i.e., pooling). An empirical analysis
of welfare seems especially important given that whether signaling improves or decreases total
welfare relative to pooling is theoretically ambiguous.2
This paper studies these questions by building an estimable model of signaling in credit markets
for unsecured loans using data from Prosper.com, an online peer-to-peer loan market. At least since
the seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), markets for unsecured loans have been considered
to be classic examples of markets that suffer from potential adverse selection problems. A key
feature of Prosper.com, however, is that each borrower can post a public reserve interest rate – the
maximum interest rate that the borrower is willing to accept – when the borrower creates a listing
on its Web site.3 In this paper, we provide evidence that the borrower’s reserve interest rate signals
his creditworthiness and explore how signaling affects market outcomes and welfare.
Prosper.com is an online platform that matches potential borrowers with potential lenders with
more than $280 million in funded loans (as of 2011). Established in 2006, it specializes in small-
scale unsecured loans to individuals with a standardized loan repayment length of 36 months. The
average funded loan is about $5,800 and debt consolidation is, by far, the most commonly stated
purpose of the loan, accounting for about 46% of all listings.
While Prosper is a relatively young and small market, it is an ideal setting for investigating
the effect of signaling on market outcomes and welfare. First, in this market we observe both the
reserve interest rate choice of the borrower as well as the contract interest rate determined by the
auction. The contract interest rate is the actual interest rate that the borrower faces in repayment
and it is often lower than the reserve interest rate. Because the reserve interest rate should not
1See Einav, Finkelstein and Levin (2010) for a survey and motivation of recent papers that go beyond testing the
existence of information asymmetry.
2For a brief discussion of how signaling equlibriun can be pareto dominated by a pooling equilibrium, see Mas-
Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), Chapter 13.C, p.454.
3We use borrower listing data from May through October of 2008 and the corresponding loan repayment data that
goes until 2011. Our description of the institutional details pertain to this period.
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affect the borrower’s repayment behavior conditional on the contract interest rate, we can isolate
the signaling value (as opposed to moral hazard) of the reserve rate by studying how the reserve rate
correlates with the default probability conditional on the contract interest rate. Second, transaction
in this market takes place online and basically all of the information that lenders observe about
the borrowers are also available to the econometrician, unlike in traditional markets. This feature
makes us somewhat less concerned about unobserved heterogeneity than in other settings.
The idea that the reserve interest rates can signal the borrowers’ creditworthiness is quite intu-
itive in the particular market we study. Consider, for example, a borrower who is posting a high
reserve rate – say, higher than the prime rate charged for typical bank loans. Then the lenders may
infer that this borrower faces difficulty borrowing from outside sources, which also raises con-
cerns about the repayment ability of the borrower. This will lead lenders to charge high interest to
compensate for the high risk. Of course, this intuition is not a complete explanation of signaling,
because there needs to be a countervailing force that induces the borrower to post a higher reserve
interest rate (otherwise, all borrowers would want to post a low reserve rate). In the market we
study, the natural countervailing force is the probability of obtaining a loan. As long as the fund-
ing probability increases as a function of the reserve rate, this can counteract the incentive for the
borrower to post a low reserve rate. These two opposing incentives create different trade-offs for
different borrowers, giving rise to the possibility of equilibrium dispersion in the reserve rate.
This rather simple intuition forms the basis of our model of the borrowers. In our model,
borrowers are heterogeneous with regard to the cost of borrowing from outside sources and the
ability to repay the loan. Given a trade-off between higher funding probability and higher interest
rate, the heterogeneity in the cost of borrowing translates to the single-crossing condition. The
low-cost types (e.g., borrowers with easy access to credit from local banks) value a decrease in the
interest rate on the potential loan relatively more than an increase in the probability of obtaining
a loan from Prosper. Conversely, the high–cost types (e.g., borrowers that do not have access to
outside credit) would value an increase in the probability of obtaining a loan relatively more than
a decrease in the interest rate. As long as the low–cost types also tend to have higher ability to pay
back loans, a separating equilibrium can be sustained in which the low–cost types have incentives
to post low reserve rates (and receive low interest loans with relatively low probability) and the
high–cost types have incentives to post high reserve rates (and receive high–interest loans with
relatively high probability).
In order to see whether the reserve interest rate functions as a signal in this market, we begin
our analysis by providing results from a series of regressions. In our first set of regressions, we
examine the effect of the reserve interest rate on the funding probability and on the actual interest
rate conditional on being funded. The results indicate that a lower reserve rate leads to a lower
funding probability, but it also leads to a more favorable contract interest rate on average even after
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controlling for various observables and selection. This implies that borrowers indeed face a trade-
off between the funding probability and the interest rate in setting the reserve rate. Moreover, this
is consistent with the notion that there exists heterogeneity in how borrowers evaluate this trade-
off: The considerable dispersion that we observe in the reserve interest rate suggests that those who
post high reserve rates care more about the probability of being funded than about what interest
they will pay and vice versa.4
In our second set of regressions, we examine whether there are any systematic differences
between those who post high reserve rates and low reserve rates. We find that those who post
high reserve rates are more likely to default than those who post low reserve rates, even after
conditioning on the contract interest rate (the actual interest rate that the borrower pays on the
loans). Given that the reserve rate should not directly affect the borrower’s repayment behavior
conditional on the contract interest rate, this result suggests that there is informational value in
the reserve rate. From the perspective of the lender, this implies that the reserve interest rate
is informative about the creditworthiness of the borrower, i.e., the reserve rate is a signal of the
borrower’s unobserved type.
Given the results of our preliminary analysis, we devote the second part of our paper to de-
veloping and estimating a structural model of the online credit market that agrees with the basic
findings of the preliminary analysis. Our model of the borrowers allows for heterogeneity regard-
ing creditworthiness and the cost of borrowing, which are privately known to the borrowers. The
borrowers choose which interest rate to post, where the choice reveals their types in equilibrium.
As for the supply side of the credit market, we model the lenders to be heterogeneous regarding
their attitude toward risk. Each lender chooses whether to fund a listing or not, what interest rate to
charge, and how much to lend. Once the loan is originated, the borrower faces monthly repayment
decisions, which we model as a single–agent dynamic programming problem.
In terms of identification, the key primitives of the model that we wish to identify are the
distribution of the borrowers’ types and the distribution of the lenders’ attitude toward risk. For
identifying the borrowers’ type distribution, we exploit variation in the borrower’s reserve rate and
how it is related to the default probability. In particular, we use the fact that the borrower’s type and
the borrower’s reserve rate have a one-to-one mapping in a separating equilibrium. This feature
is very useful, because it allows us to condition on a particular quantile of the borrower’s type
distribution by simply conditioning on a quantile of the reserve rate distribution. Then the observed
default probability at each quantile of the reserve rate distribution nonparametrically identifies the
borrower’s type. The distribution of the lenders’ attitudes toward risk is also nonparametrically
4Note that it is probably safe to assume that many borrowers are aware of this trade-off: In a prominently displayed
tutorial, Prosper informs the borrowers that setting a higher reserve rate increases the probability that the loan will be
funded.
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identified by relating the expected return of listings to their funding probability.
In our counterfactual experiment, we compare the equilibrium market outcome and welfare
under three alternative market designs – a market with signaling, a market without signaling (i.e.,
pooling) and a market with no information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. In partic-
ular, we simulate the credit supply curve under each of the three market designs by re-computing
the lenders’ and borrowers’ behavior using the estimates of our structural model. As pointed out
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the credit supply curve in loan markets may be backward bending, or
non-monotonic in the interest rate, because of adverse selection.5 The results of our counterfactual
support their prediction: the credit supply curve becomes more backward bending under pooling
when borrowers cannot signal their type with the reserve interest rate.
With respect to welfare, we find that the cost of adverse selection can be as much as 16% of the
total surplus created under no asymmetric information. We also find that while signaling restores
up to 95% of the difference in the surplus between pooling and no asymmetric information in
some markets, it destroys welfare in others. Our results provide some empirical evidence regarding
when signaling may improve welfare. Signaling seems to improve welfare most when the degree
of adverse selection is severe, while it may destroy welfare when it is modest.
The empirical findings of this paper directly apply only to the market of Prosper.com and our
model is tailored to the setting in which agents signal through the reserve rate. However, our basic
methodology can be extended to study other markets in which signaling plays an important role,
for example, pricing of new issues in IPO markets (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber, 1989), convertible
debt recalls (Harris and Raviv, 1985), etc. As long as both the signal and the ex-post performance
are observable, our model and identification strategy can be used to quantify the effect of signaling
on market outcomes and welfare.
Related Literature Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, our study
is related to the literature on adverse selection in credit markets. Since the seminal work of Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981), there have been many studies testing for adverse selection in credit markets. Ex-
amples include Berger and Udell (1992), Ausubel (1999), Karlan and Zinman (2009), and Freed-
man and Jin (2010).6 While testing for adverse selection is important in its own right and is the
first step for further analysis, estimating a model that explicitly accounts for information asymme-
5Recently, Arnold and Riley (2012) shows that the credit supply curve cannot be globally backward-bending. They
obtain this result under the assumption that the type of the borrowers affect the variance of the return but not the mean.
In our setting, the type of the borrower affects the mean as well as the variance. Hence, the mean return from a loan
can be globally concave in our setting.
6Freedman and Jin (2010) uses data from Prosper.com. Other papers that also use the data include Rigbi (2011),
Ravina (2008), Iyer et al. (2010). In Iyer et al. (2010), the authors examine the lenders’ ability to infer borrowers’
creditworthiness. They find, among other things, that the reserve interest rate affects the contract interest rate, and note
that signaling can be one interpretation of their finding.
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try among the players allows researchers to answer questions regarding welfare and market design.
Our paper goes in this direction.
The second strand of the literature to which our paper is related is the theoretical literature
on signaling. Starting with the seminal work of Spence (1973), signaling has been applied to
a wide range of topics. Even confined to applications in industrial organization, signaling has
been applied to advertising (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1986), entry deterrence (e.g., Milgrom and
Roberts, 1982), war of attrition (Hörner and Sahuguet, 2011), as well as credit markets (e.g., Bester
1986, Milde and Riley 1988). Bester (1986) shows that borrowers can signal their type through
the amount of collateral and Milde and Riley (1988) show that borrowers can signal through the
loan amount. There is also a small theoretical literature on signaling in auctions, whereby a seller
signals her private information through the reserve price (Cai, Riley and Ye, 2007, and Jullien and
Mariotti, 2006, for example).7 The signaling mechanism that we consider in this paper is very
similar to those studied in Cai, Riley and Ye (2007) and Jullien and Mariotti (2006).
In contrast to the large body of theoretical work, however, the empirical industrial organization
literature on signaling is very thin. This is because identifying the effect of signaling often requires
data on both the transaction and ex-post outcome, something that is hard to come by in industrial
organization.8 In this sense, the data set of Prosper is ideal because it allows us to link the the
signal (i.e., the reserve rate) to the outcome (i.e., default). Moreover, the fact that we can link the
two conditional on the contract interest rate allows us to isolate the signaling effect from moral
hazard.
Our paper is also related to the large empirical literature on screening. In particular, Adams,
Einav and Levin (2009) and Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2012) are two papers that are closely related
to our paper. They consider how an auto insurer can screen borrowers using the down payment.
They show that partly because of adverse selection, the lender’s expected return on the loan is non-
monotone in the loan size. A key feature of our paper that is different from theirs is that our paper
examines signaling while their paper examines screening. Moreover, our model of credit supply
has a large number of heterogenous lenders while their model has a single lender.
A Two Type Example In order to illustrate how signaling can be sustained in our setting, we
first describe a numerical example with two types of borrowers, 'L and 'H ('L < 'H). The types
are privately known to the borrowers and we interpret 'L as a “bad” type who is likely to default
7Relatedly, Roberts (2013) shows how the reserve rate can be used to overcome unobserved heterogeneity in
auctions. He studies an environment in which there is informational asymmetry between the players and the econo-
metrician, but there is no asymmetric information between the sellers and the buyers.
8Gedge, Roberts and Sweeting (2012) is one of the few papers on signaling in industrial organization. Outside of
industrial organization, there are some empirical papers that examine signaling, for example, papers on the sheepskin
effect (e.g. Hungerford and Solon, 1987). However, much of the literature have tended to focus on testing for the
existence of signaling (a few exceptions are Gayle and Golan, 2012, and Fang, 2006).
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and 'H as a “good” type who is likely to repay. Conditional on obtaining a loan at interest r, we
let u(r) + " denote the borrower’s utility from repaying the loan and D(') (' 2 f'L; 'Hg) denote
the utility from default, where " is a random shock that is realized after the borrower obtains the
loan. We let D('H) < D('L). The borrower’s utitlity from obtaining a loan at interest r is then
maxfu(r) + ", D(')g. We let (') be the borrower’s utitlity from not borrowing and assume that
('H) > ('L). This assumption simply reflects the idea that “good” types who value their credit
history, for example, have an easier time obtaining a loan from outside sources and hence have a
higher outside option. On the other hand, “bad” types, with low cost of default, e.g., borrowers who
have a damaged credit history or are expecting to default, are likely to have only limited alternative
sources of funding, and hence have a lower outside option. The borrower chooses a reserve interest
s at the time the borrower posts a listing
As for the lender, we let the lender’s utitlity from lending money be a function of the mean and
variance of the return as  Aj2, where Aj is the lender specific random variable that determines
her attitude toward risk. In this example, we assume that every borrower is randomly matched
with two lenders each of whom decides whether or not to bid on the listing, and at what interest.
The lender observes the reserve interest that the borrower posts when making her decision. The
contract interest is determined by a second price auction, i.e., the contract interest is equal to the
second lowest interest if two bidders decide to bid on the loan, and it is equal to the borrower’s
reserve rate if only one lender bids on the loan.9 We assume, in this example, that whoever bids
a lower interest rate becomes the sole lender. In this setting, the lender has a weakly dominant
strategy: If we let rj denote the interest rate at which lender j is indifferent between lending and
not lending, the weakly dominant strategy for the lender is to bid rj if rj  s and not bid otherwise.
In this simple example, a signaling equlibrium would consist of two different reserve interests
sH and sL such that 'H prefers sH to sL and vice versa. The lenders, upon observing sH , believes
that the borrower is type 'H and vice versa.10 Figure XYZ and Table 1 illustrate one particular
signaling equlibrium for u(r) =  r, D(') =  ', (') = 0:105', Aj distributed uniform [0; 1],
" distributed type I extreme value and ' 2 f1:7, 1:8g. In Figure XYZ, two curves are drawn, the
dotted curve corresponding to the indifference curve of 'H and the solid curve corresponding to the
indifference curve of 'L. The borrowers’ utility level is higher to the northeast of the indifference
curve.11 The horizontal axis corresponds to the beliefs of the lender ('^) and the vertical axis
corresponds to the reserve rate. The figure shows that if 'H chooses point sH and 'L chooses sL,
9Show that renegotiation proof? Lender and borrower both want lower r? (Possible with moral hazard)
10To be complete, one needs to specify the off-path beliefs of the lenders. One possibility is to assume that lenders
belive that ' = 'L upon observing s 6= sH : Pr(' = 'Lj s 6= sH) = 1.
11The utility level is higher to the north because raising s increases the probability of obtaining a loan. At the
current parameter values, the marginal gain from increasing the funding probability outweighs the marginal loss from
increasing in the contract interest rate for both types.
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Type Reserve Rate Lender Belief ('^) Funding Pr. Interest Rate Utility
'H sH 'H 35.5% 27.2% 0.300
sL 'L 44.5% 35.2% 0.299
'L sH 'H 35.5% 27.2% 0.300
sL 'L 44.5% 35.2% 0.302
Table 1: Outcomes and Utility Associated with Choosing sH (27:5%) and sL (36:0%). In this
Table, we show the outcomes and utility levels that correspond to choosing sH or sL for each type
of borrower.
we have a separating equilibrium.
In Table 1, we show the outcomes and the utility levels associated with choosing sH and sL for
both types of borrowers when lenders believe that sH signals high type and sL signals low type.
If a borrower posts s = sH , the funding probability is relatively low (35:5%) but the interest rate
is relatively favourable (27:18%) and vice versa. For 'H types, the favorable interest rate at sH
more than compensates for the low funding probability. Hence, the expected uility of choosing
sH (0:300) is higher than the expected utility of choosing sL (0:299) for 'H types. On the other
hand, the expected utility of choosing sL (0:302) is higher than the expected utility of choosing
sH (0:300) for 'L types. This corresponds to the fact that the indifference curve of 'H that goes
through ('H ; sH) lies to the northeast of ('H ; sL) and similarly for the indifference curve of 'L
that goes through ('L; sL).
In the full model which we present in Section 4, the types of the borrowers are continusouly
distributed and the borrowers’ decision to repay or default is modeled explicitly as a single-agent
dynamic programming problem. Moreover, the lenders will bid both an interest rate and an amount
consistent with the actual way in which Prosper operates. The number of lenders are also random.
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However, our two type example captures the basic forces behind the signaling equilibrium. There
is an inherent trade-off between funding probability and interest rate. Given that different types
differentially evaluate this trade-off, it becomes possible to sustain signaling in equilibrium.
Caption Figure A Plot of Indifference Curves on '^  s Plane. The figure plots two indifference
curves; (1) the indifference curve of 'H that goes through (c'H ; sH) (dotted curve) and (2) the
indifference curve of 'L that goes through (c'L; sL) (solid curve).
2 Institutional Background and Data
2.1 Institutional Background
Prosper.com is an online peer-to-peer lending Web site that matches borrowers with lenders and
provides loan administrative services for the lenders. Established in 2006, it has become America’s
largest peer–to–peer lending marketplace, with more than a million members and over $280 million
in loans. In this section, we describe how Prosper operates, with a particular emphasis on the
auction mechanism used to determine the interest rate.12 For details on other aspects of Prosper,
see Freedman and Jin (2010).
The sequence of events occurs according to the following timeline, (1) A borrower posts a
listing, (2) Lenders bid, (3) Funding decision is made, and (4) The borrower makes monthly loan
repayments. We explain each step in turn.
1. Borrower posts a listing A potential borrower who is interested in obtaining a loan
through Prosper first creates an account with Prosper, who pulls the applicant’s credit history from
Experian, a third-party credit-scoring agency. As long as the credit score is above a certain thresh-
old, the borrower can create a listing on Prosper’s web site. Each listing contains information
regarding the amount of loan requested, the reserve interest rate and the borrower’s characteris-
tics. The loan amount and the reserve interest are both variables that the borrower chooses, subject
to Prosper’s conditions and usury laws.13 During our sample period, the maximum loan amount
allowed on Propser was $25,000 and the usary law maximum was 36%.
The characteristics of the borrower that appear in the listing page include credit grade, home-
ownership status, debt-to-income ratio, purpose of the loan, as well as any other additional infor-
mation (text and pictures) that the borrower wishes to post. The credit grade, which corresponds to
seven distinct credit score bins (AA, A, B, C, D, E, and HR), and home-ownership status are both
12The Online Appendix contains a more detailed description of the institutional background.
13In a tutorial that walks borrowers through the listing process, Prosper advises borrowers to “Think of the interest
your are paying on your next best alternative” when posting the reserve insterst rate.
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verified by Prosper.14 Other information, such as debt-to-income ratio and purpose of the loan, is
provided by the borrower without verification by Prosper. The most commonly stated purpose of
the loan is debt consolidation, accounting for about 46% of all listings.
2. Lenders Bid Prosper maintains a list of active listings on its Web site for potential lenders.
If a potential lender finds a listing to which she wishes to lend money, she may then submit a bid
on the listing, similar to a proxy bid in online auctions. Each bid consists of an amount that the
lender is willing to lend (typically a small fraction of the loan amount that the borrower requests),
and a minimum interest rate that the lender is willing to accept. The lender can submit a bid with
an amount anywhere between $50 and the borrower’s requested amount, but the modal bid amount
is $50. The lender can bid on any active listing at any time.
For each active listing, Prosper displays the fraction of the loan funded and the active interest
rate in addition to information regarding borrower characteristics, loan amount, and the reserve in-
terest rate. The active interest rate corresponds to the standing marginal bid in multi-unit auctions.
We will explain what the active interest is, in more detail below.
3. Funding Decision The auction used in Prosper is similar to a uniform–price auction with a
public reserve price. Using an example, we explain below how the terms of the loan are determined
and which bidders become lenders. Suppose a borrower creates a listing with a requested amount
of $10,000 and a reserve interest rate of 25%. Then, Prosper adds the listing to the set of currently
active listings. For simplicity, let us assume that the lenders can submit a bid amount of only $50.
At the time the lender submits her bid, she observes the fraction of the loan funded (e.g., 80% for
the left panel in Figure 1 and 100% for the right panel). For listings that have yet to attract enough
bids to reach the requested amount (i.e., fraction of loan funded is less than 100%) that is all she
observes about what other bidders are doing. In particular, she does not observe the interest rate
of each bid. As for listings that have already received enough bids to cover the requested amount,
(i.e., fraction of loan funded is equal to 100%) the lender observes the active interest rate, which is
the interest rate of the marginal bid that brings the supply of money over the requested amount. In
our example, this corresponds to the interest rate of the 200th bid when we order the submitted bids
according to their interest rate, from the lowest to the highest. Moreover, for fully funded listings
that are still active, the lender also observes the interest rate of the losing bids, i.e., the interest rate
of the 201st bid, 202nd bid, and so on. However, the lender does not observe the interest rate of
the bids below the marginal bid.
At the end of the bid submission period, listings that have attracted more bids than is necessary
14A credit grade of AA corresponds to a credit score of 760+, a grade of A corresponds to 720–759, B to 680–719,
C to 640–679, D to 600–639, E to 540–599, and HR to 540–. The numerical credit score is not listed.
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Figure 1: Funding Decision – The figure shows how a loan is funded for the simple case in which lenders only
submit a bid with an amount of $50. The horizontal axis corresponds to amount and the vertical axis corresponds to
the interest rate. The left panel illustrates a situation in which the requested amount is $10,000, and the listing has
received 160 bids ($8,000). The right panel illustrates the situation in which the requested amount is $10,000, and it
has attracted more than 200 bids.
to fund the full requested amount are funded. However, there are no partial loans for listings that
have failed to attract enough bids to fund the total requested amount. Hence the borrower would
receive no loan in the situation depicted in the left panel of Figure 1. In our sample, about 20% of
the borrowers whose loans are not funded relist on Prosper.15
As for fully funded listings, the interest rate on the loan is determined by the marginal bid,
and the same interest rate applies to all the lenders. In the second panel of Figure 1, the listing is
funded at 24.8% and the same rate applies to all lenders who submitted bids below 24.8%. In this
sense, the auction is similar to uniform-price auctions.
4. Loan Repayments All loans originated by Prosper are unsecured and have a fixed loan
length of 36 months. The borrower pays both the principal and the interest in equal installments
over the 36-month period. If a borrower defaults, the default is reported to the credit bureaus, and a
third–party collection agency is hired by Prosper to retrieve any money from the borrower.16 From
the perspective of the borrower, defaulting on a loan originated by Prosper is just like defaulting
on any other loan, resulting in a damaged credit history.
2.2 Data
The data for our analysis come directly from Prosper.com. The data set is unique in the sense that
virtually all the information available to potential lenders as well as the ex-post performance of the
loans are observed to the researcher. We have data on the borrower’s credit grade, debt–to–income
15Interestingly, borrowers that relist on Prosper do not adjust the reserve interest rate by much. The median borrower
who relists does not change the reserve rate at all. The average change in the reserve rate is about 1:2%.
16We could not find data on the amount recovered through the collection agency.
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Amount Reserve Debt/ Home Bid Fund
Grade Requested Rate Income Owner Count Pr. Obs.
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
AA 13,144.8 8,342.8 0.132 0.047 0.364 0.976 0.812 0.391 171.0 204.2 0.534 1,420
A 12,396.2 7,881.7 0.165 0.067 0.376 0.673 0.612 0.487 116.1 161.6 0.409 1,850
B 10,622.4 6,096.5 0.211 0.075 0.386 0.655 0.593 0.491 82.5 117.2 0.334 3,068
C 7,622.3 5,158.0 0.246 0.078 0.373 0.623 0.556 0.497 39.3 65.2 0.247 5,203
D 6,368.5 4,691.3 0.287 0.075 0.389 0.711 0.370 0.483 19.8 42.3 0.155 6,581
E 4,783.5 4,868.2 0.310 0.073 0.360 0.680 0.329 0.470 4.7 13.7 0.068 5,757
HR 4,350.7 4,599.4 0.315 0.069 0.308 0.641 0.221 0.415 2.2 7.3 0.030 11,362
All 6,603.9 5,937.8 0.274 0.089 0.354 0.679 0.393 0.488 31.1 84.1 0.158 35,241
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics – Listings: This table presents summary statistics of listings posted on Prosper.com by
credit grade. Debt/Income is the debt-to-income ratio of the borrower. Home Owner is a dummy variable that equals 1
if the potential borrower is a homeowner and 0, otherwise. Bid Count is the number of submitted bids by the lenders.
Fund Pr. stands for the percentage of listings that are funded.
ratio, home ownership, etc., and additional text information that borrowers provide to lenders.17
We also have monthly repayment data of the borrowers.
Our data consist of all listings that were created from May to October of 2008 (and the corre-
sponding loan repayment data for funded listings which go until the end of 2011). Note that all
loans in our sample have either matured or ended in default. From this sample, we drop obser-
vations that were either withdrawn by the borrower, cancelled by Prosper, or missing parts of the
data. We are left with a total of 35,241 listings, of which 5,571 were funded. Our Online Appendix
contains a more detailed description of our data construction.
Table 1 reports sample statistics of the listings by credit grade. The mean requested amount is
reported in the first column, and it ranges from a high of more than $13,000 for AA listings to a low
of less than $5,000 for HR listings. In columns 2 through 4, we report the average reserve interest
rate, the debt-to-income ratio, and the home–ownership status by credit grade. In column 5, we
report the bid count, which is the average number of bids submitted to a listing, and in column 6,
we report the funding probability.
In Figure 2, we present the distribution of the reserve rate across different credit grades. As
expected, the reserve rate is higher for worse credit grades. One important thing to note is that
there is a spike at 36% for credit grades B and below. This is because 36% was the usury law
maximum for our sample. As the main focus of our analysis is on the reserve rate and the extent to
which it can be used as a signal of the creditworthiness of the borrower, variation in the reserve rate
is crucial for our analysis. The fact that there is little variation in the reserve rate among listings for
credit grades D and below implies that listings in these categories are not very informative about
17The only piece of information missing is the conversation that takes place between borrowers and potential lenders
through the Prosper Web site.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Reserve Interest Rate by Credit Grade – We show the distribution of reserve interest rate by
credit grade. The reserve interest rate is capped at 36% because of the usury law.
the signaling value of the reserve interest rate. As a consequence, we focus on the results from the
top four credit grades (AA, A, B and C) in presenting some of our analysis below.
In Figure 3, we plot the cumulative distribution functions of the contract interest rate (r) condi-
tional on the reserve interest rate (s), by credit grade. In the top left panel, we report two distribu-
tions for credit grade AA, one corresponding to s = 10% and the other corresponding to s = 20%.
Given that almost no borrowers in credit grade AA post a reserve rate of 30% or more (see Figure
2), we only report the distribution for s equal to 10% and 20% for credit grade AA. The other
panels of Figure 3 plot similar distributions for credit grades A – HR and s = 10%, 20%, 30%
and 36%. Overall, the distributions of contract interest rate given s lie to the right of s0 whenever
s0  s. This suggests that borrowers who post low reserve rates are more likely to obtain low
interest. In the next section, we show that this relationship is true even after controling for the fact
that r is right-censored at s.18
In Figure 4, we report the distributions of the bid amount, again by credit grade. The fraction of
lenders who bid $50 exceeds 70% across all credit grades, and the fraction of lenders who bid $100
is more than 10% in all credit grades. Hence, more than 80% of lenders bid either $50 or $100 for
a given loan. We also find that a small fraction of lenders bid $200, but rarely beyond that. These
observations motivate us to formulate the potential lenders’ amount choice as a discrete–choice
problem in our model section, where lenders choose from f$50; $100, and $200g rather than from
a continuous set.
Table 2 reports sample statistics of listings that were funded, which is a subset of the set of
listings. Note that the mean loan amount reported in Table 2 is smaller than the mean requested
amount shown in Table 1, which is natural given that smaller listings need to attract a smaller
18Given that the contract interest is always less than the reserve interest, the distribution F (rjs) is truncated above
at s, by construction.
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Figure 3: Distribution Function of Contract Interest Rate Given Reserve Interest Rate, by Credit Grade – The Figure
plots the distribution of contract interest rate (r) conditional on reserve interest rate (s). For s = 10%, 20%, and
30%, the distribution is computed by pooling funded listings with s 2 [s  1, s+ 1]. For s = 36%, the distribution
is computed by pooling funded listings with s 2 [34%, 36%].
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Figure 4: Distribution of Bid Amount – The figure shows the distribution of bid amount for each credit grade. Bids
with amount exceeding $250 are not shown. The fraction of these bids is about 3.5%.
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Amount Reserve Contract Debt/ Home Bid
Grade Requested Rate Rate Income Owner Count Obs.
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
AA 9,710 7,384 0.131 0.046 0.096 0.033 0.21 0.39 0.80 0.40 131.5 99.3 755
A 8,723 6,626 0.165 0.060 0.127 0.045 0.23 0.14 0.55 0.50 114.0 84.4 755
B 7,347 4,858 0.216 0.063 0.164 0.046 0.27 0.34 0.56 0.50 100.9 67.6 1,023
C 4,687 2,998 0.247 0.064 0.181 0.062 0.25 0.21 0.48 0.50 53.4 38.3 1,285
D 3,578 2,380 0.280 0.064 0.210 0.066 0.24 0.17 0.26 0.44 21.6 11.7 1,022
E 1,890 1,187 0.339 0.028 0.291 0.057 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.44 44.7 30.6 392
HR 1,690 1,288 0.339 0.036 0.300 0.057 0.20 0.44 0.17 0.38 17.6 10.4 339
All 5,821 5,285 0.233 0.086 0.179 0.079 0.24 0.28 0.47 0.50 80.0 76.7 5,571
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics – Loans: This table reports the summary statistics of loans. Contract Rate is the
interest rate charged to the borrower. Debt/Income refers to the debt-to-income ratio of the borrower. Home Owner is
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the potential borrower is a homeowner and 0, otherwise. Bid Count is the number
of submitted bids by the lenders.
number of bids in order to get funded. Also, note that the average bid count in Table 2 is higher
than in Table 1, for the obvious reason that listings need to attract sufficient number of bids to get
funded: Recall that there is no partial funding for listings that fail to attract enough bids to cover
the requested amount.
For each loan originated by Prosper, we have monthly data regarding the repayment decisions
of the borrower, i.e., we observe whether the borrower repaid the loan or not every month, and
whether the borrower defaulted. In the first column of Table 3, we report sample statistics regarding
the default probability by credit grade. The average default probability is lowest for AA loans at
14.9%, while it is highest for HR loans at 43.9%. Table 3 also reports the mean and the quantiles
of the internal rate of return (IRR) of the loans.19 The average IRR for all listings is -4.6%, and
it is negative in all credit grades except grade E, whose average IRR is 0%. The IRR for our
sample period is generally low. These low returns may reflect the fact that our sample coincides
with the period of economic downturn during the financial crisis. (Note that the return on the S&P
was at -37% during 2008).20 It may also reflect the fact that lenders were not fully aware of the
creditworthiness of the pool of borrowers on Prosper.21
Finally, Table 5 reports the summary statistics of the lenders. We find that lenders fund, on
average, 17.5 loans with a total portfolio size of about $1; 325. The median lender funds 6 loans
19If we denote the (monthly) IRR by R, then R is the interest rate that equalizes the loan amount to the discounted
sum of the stream of actual monthly repayments. In Table 3, we report the annualized IRR.
20There is evidence that loans originated after the end of our sample seem to be doing better. Using the subset of
loans that originated right after Prosper resumed operation in 2009, we find that the average IRR was 1.1%, which
is significantly higher than  4:6%. Moreover, this estimate of 1.1% is conservative because some lenders had not
finished repaying by the day we retrieved our data.
21Freedman and Jin (2010) study lender learning where lenders learn about the creditworthiness of borrowers over
time.
15
Grade Default Prob. Mean IRR sd 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Obs
AA 0.149 -0.011 0.283 -0.449 0.061 0.082 0.110 0.132 755
A 0.211 -0.025 0.331 -0.767 0.072 0.094 0.135 0.181 755
B 0.297 -0.074 0.404 -0.871 -0.229 0.136 0.169 0.211 1,023
C 0.309 -0.060 0.413 -0.871 -0.211 0.135 0.196 0.256 1,285
D 0.321 -0.036 0.424 -0.865 -0.192 0.153 0.231 0.316 1,022
E 0.372 0.000 0.475 -0.861 -0.315 0.249 0.345 0.394 392
HR 0.439 -0.112 0.532 -0.886 -0.800 0.202 0.345 0.398 339
All 0.286 -0.046 0.402 -0.858 -0.100 0.121 0.187 0.281 5,571
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics – Default Probability and Internal Rate of Return (IRR): This table reports the default
probability and IRR of the loans originated by Prosper. We present the average IRR, the standard error, and the
quantiles of the distriubution.
Mean sd 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% Obs
Portfolio Size (# of Loans) 17:5 42:4 1 2 6 16 68 29; 176
Portfolio Size ($) 1; 325 5; 314 50 126:6 350 1000 4950 29; 176
Average IRR  0:041 0:166  0:332  0:076  0:005 0:039 0:144 29; 176
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics – Lender Portfolio Characteristics: This table reports the summary statistics of the
lender’s portfolio. We present the number of loans that a lender owns in her portfolio, the total amount of loans lent
by the lender, average IRR of loans in a portfolio, the standard deviation of IRR of the loans within a portfolio for the
full sample, and the standard deviation of IRR of the loans within a portfolio for the lenders who own more than 10
loans.
and a total of $350. This suggests that the lenders do not invest a lot of money on Prosper, in
general. The mean IRR of a lender’s portfolio is about -4:1% with a standard deviation of 0:166.
3 Evidence of Signaling Through the Reserve Rate
In this section, we provide some reduced-form evidence that the borrower’s reserve interest rate
serves as a signaling device. In particular, we first show evidence that suggests that raising the
reserve rate (1) increases the funding probability; (2) increases the contract interest rate; and (3)
increases the default probability. We next argue that, taken together, these results suggest that the
reserve rate serves as a signal.
While the baseline results that we present below are based on a relatively parsimonious speci-
fication of the reduced form, the Online Appendix contains results from richer specifications with
interactions of covariates as well as specifications with additional covariates, such as text informa-
tion and more detailed credit information of the borrowers. The baseline results we report below
are broadly consistent with the results of these alternative specifications.
16
Funding Probability In order to analyze the effect of the reserve rate on the funding proba-
bility, we run a Probit model as follows:
Fundedj = 1fssj + x0jx+"j  0g; (1)
where Fundedj is a dummy variable for whether listing j is funded or not, sj is the reserve rate and
xj is a vector of controls that include the requested amount, the debt–to–income ratio, a dummy
variable for home ownership, the credit grade, calendar month, and hour of day the listing was
created.
The first column of Table 6 reports the results of this regression. The coefficient that we are
interested in is the one on the reserve rate. As reported in the first row, the coefficient is estimated
to be 2:13 and it is statistically significant. In terms of the marginal effect, a 1% increase in sj is
associated with about a 0:32% increase in the funding probability.
Contract Interest Rate Next, we run the following Tobit regression to examine the effect of
the reserve rate on the contract interest rate:
rj = ssj + x
0
jx+"j , (2)
rj =
(
rj if rj  sj
missing otherwise
.
In this expression, rj denotes the contract interest rate, rj is the latent contract interest rate, sj
is the reserve rate, and xj is the same vector of controls as before. The first equation relates the
latent contract interest rate to the reserve rate and other listing characteristics. rj is interpreted as
the latent interest rate at which the loan is funded in the absence of any censoring. The second
equation is the censoring equation, which accounts for the fact that the contract interest rate rj is
always less than the reserve rate, sj . Note that if we were to run a simple OLS regression of rj on
sj and xj , the estimate of s would be biased upwards because the mechanical truncation effect
would also be captured in s.
We report the results from this regression in the second column of Table 6. As reported in
the first row, we estimated s to be positive and significant, which seems to suggest that a lower
reserve interest rate leads to a lower contract interest rate, consistent with our hypothesis. As we
discuss next, borrowers who post high reserve rates are relatively less creditworthy. If we take this
as given, the results of regression (2) seem to suggest that lenders charge higher interest to riskier
borrowers.
In addition to the Tobit model above, we also estimated a censored quantile regression model
(see, e.g., Powell, 1986) using the same specification as equation (2). The quantile regression
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Funded Contract Rate Default Rate of Return
Reserve rate 2.1368 0.6834 2.8584 -0.5919
(0.0263) (0.0145) (0.7256) (0.1313)
Contract rate 3.2375 0.0540
(0.6507) (0.1372)
Amount -0.1070 0.0077 0.0349 -0.0045
(0.0024) (0.0002) (0.0077) (0.0013)
Debt / income -0.7971 0.0731 0.0528 -0.0314
(0.0015) (0.0037) (0.0713) (0.0197)
Home owner -0.1513 0.0137 0.1400 -0.0471
(0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0633) (0.0117)
Grade
AA 3.6468 -0.3013 -0.3966 0.0595
(0.0044) (0.0061) (0.2179) (0.0402)
A 3.0727 -0.2670 -0.3208 0.0475
(0.0033) (0.0055) (0.1932) (0.0366)
B 2.5681 -0.2347 -0.1516 0.0224
(0.0022) (0.0046) (0.1492) (0.0320)
C 1.8743 -0.1862 -0.1398 0.0380
(0.0014) (0.0038) (0.1233) (0.0288)
D 1.2754 -0.1329 -0.1825 0.0636
(0.0011) (0.0034) (0.1135) (0.0272)
E 0.5022 -0.0499 -0.3949 0.1155
(0.0014) (0.0036) (0.1271) (0.0296)
Observation 35,241 35,241 91,939 5,571
R2 0.2827 0.0224
Likelihood -1,137 -4,805
Table 6: Reduced Form Analysis - Funding Probability, Contract Interest Rate and Repayment Behavior: The first
column reports the estimated coefficients of the Probit model (expression (1)). The unit of observation is a listing.
The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the listing is funded and zero, otherwise. The second
column reports the estimated coefficients of the Tobit model (expression (2)). The dependent variable is the contract
interest rate charged to the borrower. The third column reports estimated coefficients from the panel Probit model
(expression (3)). The unit of observation is a loan - period. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that
equals one if the loan ends in default at period t. The fourth column presents estimated coefficients of the OLS model
(expression (4)). In this model, the unit of observation is a funded loan. In addition to the independent variables
shown in the table, we also control for month dummies, day-of-the-week dummies, and hour-of-the-day dummies in
all of the regressions. Standard errors are robust-heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the loan level. They are
presented in parentheses below the coefficients.
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allows us to test whether a similar relationship between rj and sj that we find for the mean holds
for different quantiles. The results of the quantile regressions are qualitatively similar.22 The results
seem to imply that F (rjs) first order stochastically dominates F (rjs0) for s  s0 (See also Figure
3).
The results of regressions (1) and (2) suggest that a borrower faces a trade-off in setting the
reserve price, i.e., the borrower must trade-off the increase in the probability of acquiring a loan
with the possible increase in the contract interest. Note that it is probably safe to assume that
many borrowers are actually aware of this trade-off: In a prominently displayed tutorial, Prosper
informs the borrowers that setting a higher reserve rate increases the probability that the loan will
be funded. Given the dispersion in the reserve rate (See Figure 2), it is natural to think that there is
unobserved borrower heterogeneity that induces borrowers to weigh the trade-off differently. For
example, if borrowers are heterogeneous with respect to the cost of obtaining credit from outside
sources, borrowers who have low cost will tend to post low reserve rates, while those who have
high cost will post high reserve rates, giving rise to dispersion in the reserve rate.
Repayment Behavior We now explore the extent to which borrowers who post high reserve
rates are similar to or different from those who post low reserve rates in terms of their ability to pay
back. In order to do so, we first run a panel Probit of an indicator variable for default on observable
characteristics of the loan as well as the reserve rate:
Defaultjt = 1fssj + rrj + x0jx + t + j + "jt  0g, (3)
where Defaultjt denotes a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if borrower j defaults on the
loan at period t, t is a period-t dummy, and j is a borrower random-effect. The coefficient s
captures the relationship between the reserve interest rate and the default probability. Note that
because we control for the contract interest rate (rj) in the regression, the effect captured by s is
purely due to selection. In other words, s is not picking up the effect of moral hazard given that
the reserve rate should not directly affect the behavior of the borrower once we condition on the
contract interest rate.
The parameter estimates obtained from this regression are shown in the third column of Table 6.
The coefficient associated with the reserve interest rate is positive and significant, with s = 1:54.
In terms of the marginal effect, a 1% increase in sj is associated with about a 1:25% increase in
the default probability. This implies that borrowers who post higher reserve interest rates tend to
default more often, which is consistent with the notion that the reserve rate is informative about the
type of the borrowers, i.e., the reserve interest rate can be used as a signal of the creditworthiness
22The results are available on request.
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of the borrower. In the second row, we also report our estimates of the coefficient on the contract
interest rate and the coefficient on the requested amount. We find that both coefficients are positive
and statistically significant. The positive coefficient on the contract interest rate may be capturing
moral hazard – higher interest tends to increase the probability of default. The positive coefficient
on the amount can be a result of either signaling or moral hazard. Borrowers who request a bigger
loan may be less creditworthy, or a bigger loan may induce borrowers to default more often because
of higher interest payments. The former explanation would be consistent with signaling, and the
latter would be consistent with moral hazard.23
We now wish to examine how the reserve rate relates to the borrower’s repayment behavior
from the perspective of the lender. In order to do so, we analyze how the IRR is related to the
reserve interest rate by estimating the following model:
IRRj = ssj + rrj + x
0
jx + "j , (4)
where IRRj is the internal rate of return of loan j and xj is the same vector of observable charac-
teristics as before. As with our discussion of regression (3), the coefficient on sj captures the pure
selection effect given that we control for the contract interest rate in the regression.
The parameter estimates obtained from this regression are shown in the fourth column of Table
6. As expected, the coefficient on sj is negative and significant (s =  0:59). This is consistent
with the results of regression (3), where we examined the relationship between rj and the default
probability. The coefficient on rj is positive, but not statistically significant. This may be due to
moral hazard.
Interpretation of the Results Taken together, our regression results seem to indicate that (1)
there is a trade-off in setting the reserve rate, i.e., a trade-off between a larger funding probabil-
ity and a higher contract interest rate; (2) borrowers are heterogeneous with respect to how they
evaluate this trade-off; (3) those who post high reserve rates tend to be relatively less creditworthy
and those who post low reserve rates tend to be relatively more creditworthy; and (4) the lenders
anticipate this and charge higher interest to riskier borrowers who post high reserve rates. These
results are informative about how signaling is sustained in equilibrium: “high cost” types, who
have high cost of borrowing from outside sources are more willing to sacrifice a favorable interest
rate for a bigger probability of being funded, while the opposite is true of the “low cost” types.
Because borrowers who post high reserve rates default relatively more often than borrowers who
23The borrower’s choice of the loan size is an interesting issue, but it is hard to tease out moral hazard and adverse
selection. That is one reason why our paper focuses on the borrower’s choice of the reserve rate. Note, however, that
we are not ruling out the possibility that the loan amount can also be a signal. See section 4.4 for more details. For
an analysis of the loan size and down payment in the context of subprime lending in used–car markets, see Adams,
Einav, and Levin (2009) and Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2012).
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post low reserve rates, “high cost” types are also less creditworthy while “low cost” types are more
creditworthy. Hence borrowers who are “low cost” and creditworthy prefer flow interest, low
probability of receiving a loang to fhigh interest, high probability of receiving a loang, and vice
versa. This prevents “bad” types from mimicking “good” types and sustains separation of types
through signaling.
While the results that we present in this section correspond to relatively parsimonious spec-
ifications of the reduced form, the results are quite robust. As we discussed before, the Online
Appendix contains results from various alternative specifications which are qualitatively similar to
those presented above. For example, we obtain similar results when we restrict the sample only to
the set of listings posted by borrowers for the purpose of consolidating debt. In addition, there are
papers using additional graphical and textual data that report similar effect of the reserve rate on
various outcome variables. For example, Ravina (2008) augments the Prosper data with the per-
ceived attractiveness of the borrowers using the photos that borrowers post and Freedman and Jin
(2010) includes variables such as social ties of the borrower, etc. Their findings are reassuring in
the sense that inclusion of these additional variables do not change much the estimated coefficients
of the reserve rate (see Table 5 of Freedman and Jin, 2010 and Table IV of Ravina, 2008). While
there may still be omitted variables in our specification, we think that the bias arising from them
are limited.
4 Model
In this section, we develop a model of the borrowers and the lenders who participate in Prosper,
which we later take to the data. Our model has three parts. The first part of our model concerns
the reserve interest rate choice of the borrowers, the second part concerns the lenders’ bidding
behavior and the third part of our model pertains to the borrowers’ repayment behavior. We collect
and discuss our modeling choices and assumptions at the end of this section.
4.1 Borrowers
Borrower Repayment We first describe the repayment stage of the borrower’s decision prob-
lem and work our way backwards. We model the repayment behavior of the borrower as a sequen-
tial decision of 36 (= T ) months, which is the length of the loans that Prosper originates. We write
the terminal decision of the borrower at period T as follows:(
full repayment: if uT (r) + "T  D(')
default: otherwise,
(5)
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where uT (r) + "T denotes the period utility of the borrower if he repays the loan in full, r denotes
the interest rate on the loan, and ' denotes the (unobserved) type of the borrower that determines
the likelihood of repaying the loan. While there are many ways to interpret ' and D() – e.g., as
unobserved liquid asset/wealth of the borrower – we adopt the interpretation ofD(') as the default
cost of a borrower whose type is equal to '. That is, the borrower compares the utility of repaying
the loan (uT (r) + "T ) with the cost of default (D(')), choosing to repay the loan if and only if the
former is greater than the latter.
We assume without loss of generality that D(') is monotonically decreasing in ', i.e., the
disutility of defaulting is larger for borrowers with higher '. Hence, borrowers with high ' are
“good” types who value avoiding default and maintaining a good credit history. Note that our
interpratation of ' is only one of many.24 In the Online Appendix, we provide an isomorphic
model in which ' is interpretated as wealth/asset of the borrower.
We assume ' to be independent of "T , conditional on observables. The conditional indepen-
dence of "T and ' may appear to be a very strong assumption, but mean independence is actually
without loss of generality. To see this, if E["T j'] 6= 0, we can subtract E["T j'] from both sides of
equation (5) and by appropriately redefining D() and "T , we have an observationally equivalent
model with E["T j'] = 0. This is possible because we allow D() (or equivalently, the distribution
of ') to be nonparametric.25 While mean independence is not the same as independence, we think
that this alleviates some of the concerns regarding our assumption. We come back to this point at
the end of this section (Section 4.4).
Now let VT denote the expected utility of the borrower at the beginning of the final period T ,
defined as VT (r; ') = E[maxfuT (r) + "T ; D(')g]. Then, the decision of the borrower at period
t < T is as follows: (
repayment: if ut(r) + "t + Vt+1(r; ')  D(')
default: otherwise,
where ut(r) + "t is the period t utility of repaying the loan,  is the discount factor, and Vt+1(r; ')
is the continuation utility, which can be defined recursively. We allow ut to depend on t in order
to capture any deterministic time dependence while we assume f"tg to be i.i.d across t and mean
zero.
We have presented the model up to now without making explicit the dependence of the prim-
itives of the model on observable borrower/listing characteristics such the credit grade. This is
purely for expositional purposes. In our identification and estimation, we let ut, F"t , and F' de-
24' is the unobserved type of the borrower that affects the propensity to make repayments. The exact interpretation
of ' is not very important for our purposes.
25Intuitively, one can think of this as loading all of the "systematic" component on'. In other words, ifE["T j'] 6= 0,
we can load on ' the part of "T that is correlated with '.
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pend on observable characteristics. In particular, we allow F"t and F' to depend on observable
characteristics in an arbitrary manner in our identification.
Borrower Reserve Rate Choice Now we describe our model of the borrower’s reserve in-
terest choice. When the borrower determines the reserve interest rate, s, he has to trade off its
effect on the probability that the loan is funded, and its effect on the contract interest rate, r. The
borrower’s problem is then to choose s, subject to the usury law limit of 36%, as follows:
max
s0:36
V0(s; ') = max
s0:36

Pr(s)
Z
V1(r; ')f(rjs)dr + (1  Pr(s))

, (6)
where Pr(s) is the probability that the loan is funded, f(rjs) is the conditional distribution of
the contract interest rate given s, and  is the borrower’s utility from the outside option, i.e., the
borrower’s utility in the event of not obtaining a loan from Prosper. Borrowers with high values
of  have good outside option, e.g., borrowing money from relatives, friends, and local banks, etc.
Borrowers with low values of  have bad outside option. We suppress the dependence of Pr(s) and
f(rjs) on the characteristics of the borrower. Although Pr(s) and f(rjs) are equilibrium objects,
they are taken as exogenous and known by the borrower.
Note that an important choice variable for the borrower that we do not model is the loan amount.
We treat the loan amount as part of the set of conditioning variables. Given that the borrowers’
reserve rate choice has to solve equation (6) conditional on the optimal choice of the loan amount,
treating the loan size as a covariate does not bias our estimates. To the extent that the loan size
has a signaling effect, we will be able to pick this up directly when we estimate the distribution of
types conditional on borrower covariates. We come back to this point at the end of this section.
The first term in the bracket in equation (6) captures the borrower’s expected utility in the event
of obtaining a loan through Prosper: V1(r; '), which is the value function of the borrower at period
t = 1, is integrated against the distribution of the contract interest rate f(rjs). The second term
captures the utility of the borrower in the event the loan is not funded: (1 Pr(s)) is the probability
that this event occurs, which is multiplied by the utility of the outside option, .
In what follows, we assume that ' and  are related as
 = ('),
where () is an increasing function of ', where ' is the private type of the borrower we defined
earlier. This assumption simply reflects the idea that “good” types (high '), who value their credit
history, for example, have an easier time obtaining a loan from outside sources, such as relatives,
friends, and local banks, etc., and hence have a high ('). On the other hand, “bad” types, with
low cost of default, e.g., borrowers who have a damaged credit history or are expecting to default
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in the future anyway, are likely to have only limited alternative sources of funding, and hence have
a low (').
The first–order condition associated with problem (6) is as follows,
@
@s
Pr(s)
Z
V1(r; ')f(rjs)dr   (')

+ Pr(s)
Z
V1(r; ')
@
@s
f(rjs)dr = 0, (7)
for an interior solution. Equation (7) captures the trade-off that the borrower faces in determining
the reserve interest. The first term is the incremental utility gain that results from an increase in the
funding probability, and the second term is the incremental utility loss resulting from an increase
in the contract interest rate.
Recall from the previous section that we found strong evidence that Pr(s) is increasing in s and
that F (rjs) first order stochastically dominates F (rjs0) for s  s0, where F (rjs) is the conditional
CDF of r. We note that under these conditions, the single crossing property (SCP) is satisfied
for s < 0:36. From the perspective of the borrower, SCP is necessary and sufficient to induce
separation. Hence there is no pooling among types below the usury law maximum and pooling
occurs only at the maximum. We state this as a proposition below.
Proposition 1 If @
@s
Pr(s) > 0 and F (rjs) FOSD F (rjs0) for s0 > s, then we have SCP, i.e.,
@2
@s@'
V0(s; ') < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
To see the intuition for why SCP holds, consider the marginal utility from increasing s, @
@s
V0(s; '),
for a given type '. As we explained above, @
@s
V0(s; ') has two components. One is the incremental
utility gain from an increase in the funding probability, and the other is the incremental utility loss
resulting from an increase in the contract interest rate. The first component is decreasing in ',
because borrowers with high ' already have a high outside option – these borrowers do not appre-
ciate the increase in the funding probability as much as low ' types. The second component is also
decreasing in ', because borrowers with high ' are likely to bear the full cost of an increase in r,
while borrowers with low ' will not – the low ' types will default with high probability anyway.26
A formal proof of this proposition as well as all other proofs are contained in the Appendix.
Before turning to the lenders’ model, we briefly discuss the optimal reserve rate choice of the
borrowers when the usury law limit is binding. Recall from our discussion of Figure 2 that there
is a non-negligible mass at exactly 36% for credit grades B and below, implying that the usury law
maximum is a binding constraint for many borrowers in these credit grades. For credit grades B
and C, the pattern in the data seem broadly consistent with partial pooling, i.e., separation of types
26Conditional on default, the borrower does not have to bear the full cost of a high interest rate.
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below 36%, and pooling at 36%. For there to be partial pooling, we need an extra condition to hold
(in addition to the requirements in Proposition 1) that prevents the pooled types from deviating.
We describe these conditions in the Online Appendix. For these two credit grades (i.e., B and C),
we will use them in our estimation accounting for the fact that there is separation of types below
36%, and some pooling at 36%. For credit grades D and below, an even larger fraction of the
borrowers submit a reserve interest rate at the usury law maximum, leaving little variation in the
reservation interest rate. This means that data from these categories are not very informative about
the signaling value of the reserve rate. Hence in our estimation, we only focus on credit grades
AA, A, B, and C.
4.2 Lenders
In this subsection, we describe the model of the lenders. LetN be the (random) number of potential
lenders. We let FN denote its cumulative distribution function with support f0; 1;    ; Ng, where
N is the maximum number of potential lenders. The potential lenders are heterogeneous with
regard to their attitude toward risk and with regard to their opportunity cost of lending.
Each potential lender must decide whether to submit a bid or not and what to bid if she does,
where a bid is an interest-amount pair. At the time of bidding, a potential lender observes the
active interest rate in addition to various characteristics of the listing, such as the reserve rate. In
principle, the lender is free to bid any amount between $50 and the full amount requested by the
borrower, but as we showed in Section 2, the vast majority of the bid amounts are either $50, $100,
or $200. We therefore proceed with the assumption that lenders face a discrete set of amount f$50,
$100, $200g to choose from.
Lender’s Problem with No Amount Choice We first describe the case when the lender can
only bid $50, so that the lender’s decision is whether to bid or not and what interest rate to bid. We
later extend the model to the case with amount choice. Before the lender can decide what to bid,
the lender must first form beliefs over the return she will make if she funds a part of the loan. Given
that the average return from funding loans on Prosper was negative for this sample period, we do
not want to impose rational expectations. In our baseline results, we allow the lenders’ beliefs to
be different from the actual realized distribution of returns, albeit in a very simple way.
Following the standard specification used in the asset pricing literature, we assume that the
lender’s utility from owning an asset depends on the mean and variance of the return on the asset.
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Thus, we specify the utility of lender j who lends to listing Z at contract interest rate r, as follows:
U = ~ULj (Z(r))  ~"0j
where ~ULj (Z(r)) = ~j(Z(r))  Aj~2j(Z(r))  c.
Z(r) is the random return from investing in Z at rate r, and ~j(Z(r)) and ~2j(Z(r)) are lender j’s
expecation of the return and variance. Aj is a lender specific random variable known only to lender
j that determines her attitude toward risk and c and ~"0j are deterministic and random opportunity
costs of lending to listing Z. If we express ~j and ~2j as deviations from the mean and variance that
correspond to the actual realization of returns, we can rewrite the previous expression as follows:
U = ULj (Z(r))  "0j
where ULj (Z(r)) = (Z(r))  Aj2(Z(r))  c
"0j = ~"0j + U
L
j (Z(r))  ~ULj (Z(r)),
where "0j now includes lender forecasting error as well as the opportunity cost of lending. (Z(r))
and 2(Z(r)) are the expected return and variance computed using the realized distribution of
returns.
For our baseline results, we make two important assumptions, which are (1) "0j does not depend
on r; and (2) Aj and "0j are independent. The two assumptions are very convenient because the
lender’s model is then isomorphic to the model in which lenders have rational expectations. While
these are strong assumptions, they still allow, for example, the lenders to be optimistic about the
expected return. This would be the case if j(Z(r)) = (Z(r)) + "j and "j has positive mean.
However, the independence assumption implies that the lenders’ beliefs over the variance coincide
with the realized variance. We relax the independence assumption in Section 9.
Note that the mean and variance depend on the characteristics of listing Z, such as the reserve
interest rate, loan amount, credit grade, etc., in addition to r. The characteristics of the loan other
than r are suppressed to simplify notation. Also, in order to account for the possibility that lenders’
beliefs change over time, we let the mean of "0j to change each month. This time dependence is
also supressed.
In order to study the lender’s problem, it is useful to illustrate it graphically. Figure 5 is a
graphical representation of the lender’s problem. In the left panel of this figure, we take 2 to be
the horizontal axis and  to be the vertical axis. Now, consider a listing Z. For each realization
of the contract interest rate, consider the mean return, (Z(r)), and the variance of the return,
2(Z(r)). Note that we can plot the points ((Z(r)); 2(Z(r))) on this   2 plane for each r.
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Figure 5: Graphical Representation of the Lender’s Problem: Case of No Amount Choice – The figure illustrates how
the lender should bid when there is no amount choice. In the left panel, the horizontal axis is 2 and the vertical axis
is . For each listing and for each realization of the contract interest rate, we can assign a corresonding point on this
   2 plane. Curve C corresponds to the mean and variance of a listing for different realizations of r. The dashed
line is the lender’s indifference curve. The right panel plots ULj (Z(r)) against r.
Curve C in the left panel of Figure 5 illustrates the possible mean and variance for a given
listing. The end point of the curve corresponds to the return and variance associated with the case
when the listing is funded at the reserve rate, so that r = s. As the contract rate is bid down from
s, the corresponding point on the    2 plane changes, and this is shown as a movement along
Curve C in the direction of the arrows. Note that we have also drawn a dashed line in the left panel
of Figure 5. This is the lender’s indifference curve, i.e., the set of points that makes the lender
indifferent between lending and not lending. As the lender’s utility function is linear with respect
to  and 2, the indifference curve is a straight line, i.e.,  Aj2  c  "0j = 0. Any point above
this line gives the lender a strictly higher utility than the outside option, and vice versa. The lender
is exactly indifferent between lending money and not lending money when the contract interest
rate is r0.
In the right panel of Figure 5, we plot the utility of the lender, ULj (Z(r)), as a function of r. As
the contract rate is bid down from s, and as the corresponding point on the   2 plane changes,
so does the utility from funding the loan. At r = r0, the lender is indifferent between lending and
not lending, which is reflected in the fact that ULj (Z(r)) crosses "0j at r0. Note that as drawn in the
figure, CurveC intersects with the lender’s indifference curve only once, or equivalently, ULj (Z())
crosses "0j just once. The analysis for the case in which Curve C intersects with the indifference
curve multiple times is more or less the same so we assume it away to simplify exposition. Our
Proposition 3, which covers the case with lender amount choice is general enough to allow for
multiple intersections.
We now claim the following: Under the assumption that the lender behaves as if she is never
pivotal (i.e., never marginal), and that ULj (Z()) crosses "0j just once, bidding r0 is a (weakly)
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dominant strategy for the lender. That is, it is optimal for the lender to bid an interest rate that
makes the lender indifferent between lending and not lending. We state this as a proposition below.
Proposition 2 Suppose that ULj (Z()) crosses "0j just once. Under the assumption that the lender
behaves as if she is never marginal, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the lender to bid an interest
rate that makes the lender indifferent between lending and not lending.
Proof. See Appendix.
The reason for why this strategy is weakly-dominant is the same as why bidding one’s value
is weakly dominant in a second-price auction. That is, as long as the lender is infra-marginal (i.e.,
not pivotal), increasing the bid does not affect the contract interest rate. Hence, it is in the lender’s
best interest to bid her value. The proof of the proposition is in the Appendix.
While it is certainly restrictive, we think that assuming that lenders behave as if they will never
be pivotal is a reasonable approximation of the lenders’ behavior. Given that the average requested
amount is $6; 603 for all listings ($5,821 for funded listings) and that the vast majority of the
lenders bid $50, a large number of bids are required to fund a single loan (on average there are
about 80 winning bids; see Table 2). Hence the probability of becoming the pivotal bidder is quite
low. Moreover, not only is the probability of being the pivotal bidder very low, the possible gain
from bidding strategically is also small – the difference between the lowest interest rate among the
losing bids and the interest rate of the marginal bid is only about 0:12%, on average. For these
reasons, we assume in what follows that lenders behave as if they will not be pivotal.
Lender’s Problem with Amount Choice Thus far, our discussion has considered the case
with no amount choice for the lenders. Now consider the case with amount choice, where the
borrower chooses q from the set M = f50, 100, 200g or chooses not to bid. Note that if the lender
bids amount q to listing Z at contract interest rate r, thenE[qZ(r)] = q(Z(r)) and V ar(qZ(r)) =
q22(Z(r)). Hence, lender j’s utility can be expressed as follows,
U = ULj (qZ(r))  "0j = q(Z(r))  Aj(q(Z(r)))2   cq   "0j , (8)
where the cost of lending now depends on q as cq.
When the lender faces an amount choice, she needs to keep track of the utility associated with
all possible actions. This is depicted in Figure 6. The three curves in Figure 6 correspond to
ULj (50Z()), ULj (100Z()), and ULj (200Z()). Just as before, there is a (weakly) dominant strategy
for the lender under the assumption that the bidder is not pivotal. For the case shown in Figure 6,
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Figure 6: Graphical Representation of the Lender’s Problem: Case of Amount Choice – The figure illustrates how
the lender should bid when there is amount choice. Each curve ULj (qZ(r)) illustrates the relationship between r and
the lender’s utility net of "0j when the lender bids q. I1 corresponds to the region of the active interest rate for which
bidding $200 is optimal. I2, I3, and I4 correspond to the regions of the active interest rate for which bidding $100,
$50, and $0 is optimal, respectively.
a (weakly) dominant strategy can be described by the following bidding strategy:
bid amount $200 at interest r0 if active interest rate 2 [r0; s]
bid amount $100 at interest r00 if active interest rate 2 [r00; r0)
bid amount $50 at interest r000 if active interest rate 2 [r000 ; r00)
do not bid if active interest rate 2 [0; r000),
where the active interest rate is understood to be equal to s if the listing has not attracted enough
bids to reach the requested amount. Basically, the lender should bid an amount q that maximizes
ULj (qZ(r)) when the active interest rate is r. The optimal interest rate associated with the amount
is the minimum interest that makes ULj (qZ()) higher than ULj (q0Z()). We now state the previous
analysis in the form of a proposition.
Proposition 3 Define a partition I0 = [0; r1], I1 = [r1; r2],   IM = [rM ; s], and a corresponding
quantity for each interval, q(0), q(1),   , q(M), where q(k) 2 f$0g [M , so that ULj (q(k)Z)  
"0j  ULj (q0Z) "0j for all q0 and r 2 Ik.27 Under the assumption that the lender behaves as if she
is never pivotal, it is a dominant strategy to bid q(k) and interest rate rk when the active interest
rate is in Ik.
We conclude the lender’s model by briefly discussing the relationship between the model and
identification. Using the ex-post borrower repayment data, we can identify (Z(r)) and (Z(r))
27To be more precise, when q(k) 6= 0, ULj (q(k)Z) "0j  maxf0;maxq2M ULj (q(k)Z) "0jg and when q(k) = 0,
0  maxq2M ULj (q(k)Z)  "0j .
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for each r.28 In particular, we can identify (Z(s)) and (Z(s)), where s is the reserve interest
rate, i.e., we can identify the “starting end point” of Curve C for any listing. This means that for
each distribution of A and N (the risk aversion parameter of the lender and the number of potential
lenders) the lenders’ bidding strategy described above will induce a probability distribution over
(i) whether a listing is funded and (ii) the number of lenders who bid $0, $50, $100, and $200 for
listings that are not funded. In the next section, we show that this mapping from the primitives to
the probability distribution over (i) and (ii) is actually a one-to-one mapping. Correspondingly, our
estimation is based on matching the predicted distribution with the sample distribution.
4.3 Equilibrium
We now discuss equilibrium existence and uniqueness. There always exists an equilibrium of the
model we described, but there may not exist a separating equilibrium.2930 Mailath (1987) (see also
Mailath and von Thadden (2013)) provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a separating
equilibrium. The main condition is a single-crossing condition on the borrower’s utility function,
V0:
@
ds
V0(s; '; ~';X)

@
d~'
V0(s; '; ~';X) is monotone increasing in ', 8X , (9)
where V0(s; '; ~';X) is the borrower’s expected utility from posting a reserve interest rate s, when
the borrower is of type ', and the lenders perceive him to be of type ~'.31 X is a vector of condi-
tioning variables such as borrower and listing characteristics. As long as lenders play the strategy
described in Proposition 2, we can compute the funding probability and the distribution of r when
lenders perceive the borrower to be of type ~'. Hence, we can evaluate V0 for any given parameter
value.
While it is relatively straightforward to check numerically whether the model satisfies (9) for
a given parameter value, it is not easy to analytically characterize the set of parameters that satisfy
these conditions. This is because V0 is a fairly complicated object – it is an integral of a value
function.
28(Z(r)) and (Z(r)) correspond to the mean and variance of Z(r) computed assuming rational expectations.
29To be more precise, there exists an equilibrium in which all lenders have rational expectations. Note that our
model is isomorphic to the model with rational expectations.
30There always exists a pooling equilibrium. As long as the lenders’ beliefs off the equilibrium path are sufficiently
pessimistic, all borrowers will find it optimal to post the same reserve rate.
31More precisely,
V0(s; '; ~') = Pr(s; ~')
Z
V1(r; ')f(rjs; ~')dr + (1  Pr(s; ~'))('),
where we have suppresed the dependence onX . Pr(s; ~') and f(rjs; ~') are the funding probability and the distribution
of the contract interest rate, respectively, when the lender percives the borrowe to be of type ~'.
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In what follows, we proceed by estimating the model without checking whether or not a sepa-
rating equilibrium exists at any given parameter. Once we have estimated our parameters, we then
check whether the sufficient conditions for separation are satisfied at the estimated values.32 At
the estimated parameter values, the conditions seem to generally hold. Note that this procedure
gurantees consistency of the estimates that we obtain.33
As for uniqueness, signaling models generally admit multiple equilibria because there are al-
ways pooling equilibria in which no information is transmitted. It turns out, however, that under
a mild assumption on the beliefs over borrower types off the equilibrium path, there is a unique
separating equilibrium (see Mailath, 1987).34 Given our regression results from section 3, assum-
ing that the agents are playing a separating equilibrium is not unreasonable. Hence, as long as the
assumptions on the off-path beliefs are satisfied, we do not need to worry about multiple equilibria.
4.4 Model Discussion
In this section, we discuss some of our modeling choices and assumptions.
Independence of "t and ' An important assumption we made in our borrower’s repayment
model is the independence of "t and '. As we discussed above, mean independence of "t condi-
tional on ', i.e., E["tj'] = 0, is without loss of generality. This is because we can always redefine
"t and ' – redefine "t as ("t   E["tj']) and D() as (D()  E["tj]) – so that E["tj'] = 0: Given
that we allow D() (or equivalently, the distribution of ') to be nonparametric in our identification
and estimation, this is without loss of generality. While, we assume independence of "t and ',
which is stronger than mean independence, it gives some credibility to the independence assump-
tion.
Serial Correlation in "t Another assumption we made in our borrower’s repayment model
is the independence of f"tg across t. Note that what we observe in the data are a sequence of
binary decisions (repay or default) for each borrower, in which default is an absorbing state: If
a borrower defaults, we do not observe any repayment decisions from that point on. Unlike in a
situation where there are distinct decisions for each of the T periods (i.e., no absorbing state), our
32The reason why we don’t include this condition in our estimation routine is because we need to verify whether the
monotonicity requirement is satisfied for all X . It would be very computationally intensive to include this condition
in the estimation routine.
33The set of parameters for which (9) is satisfied, say, M , is a subset of the set of all parameters, say . Hence,
if we find that our estimate (the minimizer of the criterion function over ) satisfies (9), then the same parameter
minimizes the criterion function over M .
34A sufficient condition is that lenders associate off the equilibrium action with the worst borrower type.
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particular data structure precludes us from identifying possible serial correlation in f"tg.35 Only
the marginals of f"tg are relevant for data generation. While this may appear to be a limitation,
this means that as long as f"tg is structural, our counterfactual policy is robust to serial correlation
among f"tg.
Interpretation of ' Recall that the unobservable type of the borrower (') is interpreted as
default cost in our model. However, we can write an alternative, observationally equivalent model
where ' has the interpretation of unobserved income/assets of the borrower. We show this in the
Online Appendix. While there are several ways to model borrower heterogeneity – default cost,
income, or some combination of the two – the implied default pattern may be very similar. For our
purposes, the exact nature of heterogeneity among the borrowers is not very important because it
is structural to our counterfactual policy. This is not to say, however, that the distinction may be
very important in other contexts.
Signaling through the Loan Amount In addition to the reserve interest rate, an important
variable that the borrower needs to optimize over is the requested amount. We do not explicitly
model the amount choice of the borrower and instead focus only on the reserve rate choice. First of
all, the reserve rate choice offers a cleaner setting to analyze the effect of signaling. Given that the
reserve rate should not affect the lender’s repayment behavior conditional on the contract interest
rate, the correlation between the reserve rate and the default probability is informative about the
pure informational value of the reserve rate as a signal. On the other hand, the requested amount
can affect the default probability both through informational channels as well as through moral
hazard.
Moreover, note that focusing only on the reserve rate choice and abstracting away from the
amount choice does not bias our results for the following two reasons. First, even when the bor-
rower optimizes over the requested amount, the borrower still chooses the reserve rate in accor-
dance with equation (6).36 That is, conditional on the amount that the borrower requests, the
borrower’s reserve interest rate still solves equation (6). Second, we are allowing ' to be (arbitrar-
ily) correlated with the requested amount, allowing for the possibility that the requested amount
35Consider an extreme case when f"tg takes on only two values, f+1; 1g. The following two cases are ob-
servationally equivalent: (1) f"tg are perfectly correlated, so "1 =    = "T , and Pr("1 = +1) = p (2) f"tg are
independently (but not identically) distributed, with Pr("1 = +1) = p, and "t = +1 with probability 1 for all
t  2. For case (1), either "1 =    = "T = +1 or "1 =    = "T =  1 with probability p and 1   p. For case
(2), "1 = +1 or "1 =  1 with probability p and 1   p, but "t = +1 with probability 1 for all t  2. Note that
(1) and (2) are different (f"tg are correlated in (1) and independent in (2)), but we cannot identify between (1) and
(2): In both cases, the borrower would default with probability p in the first period, and conditional on not defaulting
in the first period, the borrower never defaults later. Our counterfactual results would be the same under either data
generating process.
36We do need Pr(s) to be strictly monotone for all s.
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can be informative about '. To the extent that the requested amount has a signaling aspect, we will
be able to capture it directly when estimating the distribution of ' as a function of covariates.
Lender Beliefs The lenders of our model form beliefs over the distribution of the return on
the loans when they make their bidding decisions. While we allow the lenders’ beliefs to differ
from the realized distribution of returns, we do so in a very restricted manner. In order to check the
robustness of our results, we estimate our model under alternative beliefs. The robustness results
are presented in Section 9.
Lender Portfolio In our model, we abstracted from the portfolio decision of the lenders. In
principle, however, lenders should care about the correlation between a given loan and existing
loans. Hence, the lender’s utility should include a term that captures this correlation – which is
currently missing.
As we discussed in Section 2.2, the average lender funds a total of 17.5 loans with a total
portfolio size of about $1; 300. Given that this is a relatively small amount of money, the correlation
in the returns among loans may not be of first-order importance to many lenders. However, to the
extent that portfolio considerations are important, our estimate of the distribution of the lender’s
risk attitude (Aj) may pick up the correlation between the listing’s return and the lender’s other
loan holdings as well as lender specific risk attitude.37
Cost of Revising the Bid The optimal strategy described in Proposition 2 requires the lenders
to submit new bids as the active interest rate changes. In the situation depicted in Figure 6, for
example, the lender would submit new bids as the active interest rate drops below r0, r00, and r000.
This implicitly takes as given that lenders have low cost of revising their bid.38 While this may
be a strong assumption, it allows us to abstract from the dynamics of bidding and increases the
tractability of the model. Also, in order to make sure that our estimates are not too sensitive to this
assumption, we do not use the full implications of the dominant strategy (For example, we do not
use the exact distribution of the realized contract interest rate). Our estimation only uses moments
that are not too sensitive to this assumption as we describe below.
37The lender may care about the variance of a given loan (2(Z)) as well as the correlation between Z and other
loans. The correlation term will get picked up by Aj in the estimation.
38Some bidding strategies can be replicated with a one-time proxy bid. For example, one can submit four $50 bids,
two bids with interest rate r0, and two others with r0 and r00, respectively. This bidding strategy is equivalent to the
dominant strategy we described for Figure 6.
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5 Identification
5.1 Identification of the Borrower’s Primitives
The primitives of the borrower that we would like to identify are the period utility function, ut(),
the distribution of borrower types, F'jX , the cost of default, D(), the utility from the outside
option, (), and the distribution of "t, F"jX . We specify ut to depend on the repayment amount
and a time trend as ut(r) =  (rxamt)+dt, where xamt is the loan size and dt is a period specific
constant term.
We begin with a few remarks. First, note that we allow the distribution of ', F'jX , as well
as the distribution of "t, F"jX , to depend on borrower/listing characteristics, X . In particular, the
distribution of ' can depend on the amount requested. To the extent that there is some signal-
ing value in the requested amount, the conditional distribution of ' will depend on the amount
requested. We are allowing for this possibility. Second, note that we can normalize either D()
or F'jX (for some X = X) without loss of generality. For identification (and estimation) we
normalize D(') =  '.39 It is also easy to see that we can normalize one of the constants in ut
without loss of generality: Hence we set dT = 0.40
The intuition for our identification is quite simple. Recall that we model the borrowers’ re-
payment decision as a sequence of binary decisions. Hence, if we knew the value of ' for each
borrower, our model is a simple binary threshold crossing model and identification of the primi-
tives easily follow from existing results (See, e.g., Mazkin (1992)).41 The question then becomes
how we identify '. The identification of ' relies on the observation that there is a one-to-one
(monotonic) mapping of s to ' conditional on X (for the case of no pooling). Recall from Propo-
sition 1 that the objective function of the borrower when choosing s (see equation (6)) satisfies the
single crossing property. This guarantees that types with higher ' choose lower s conditional on
X . In particular, if we take loans for which the reserve rate is equal to the  quantile of FsjX , the
borrowers all have ' equal to the 1    quantile of F'jX . Then the default rate among borrowers
with reserve rate equal to F 1sjX() identifies F'jX() (and hence the value of ' for each borrower).
The following proposition states our results formally:
Proposition 4 F'jX , F"jX and () are nonparametrically identified up to location normalizations.
fdtg are also identified.
39This is because a specification with ~D(') =  ', ~F'jX = F'jX  D 1, and ~ =   D 1 is going to be
observationally equivalent to one with D, F'jX , and . The important component of the model is the distribution of
D('), rather than the distribution of ' or the shape of D() per se.
40If we set ~dt = dt +  (8t) ~"t = "t    (8t), it will be observationally equivalent to dt, F"jX .
41To be precise, the binary threshold crossing model identifies F"tjX for some X. In order to identify F"tjX for
X 6= X, we also use the first-order condition (7). Once F'jX and F"jX are identified, () is identified from equation
(7).
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Proof. See Appendix.
Nonparametric identification of F'jX , F"jX and () holds even when there is partial pooling at
36%. The proof of this Proposition when there is no pooling appears in the Appendix. The Online
Appendix contains the proof of the proposition when there is partial pooling.
5.2 Identification of the Lender’s Primitives
The primitives of the lender’s model that we need to identify are the distribution of the coefficient of
risk, FA, the distribution of the outside option, F"0 , the cost of lending, cq, and the distribution of the
number of potential bidders, FN , which is assumed to have finite support f1; ::; Ng. Our proof of
identification proceeds by first showing identification of FA, F"0 , and cq under the assumption that
Pq(; ), which we will define below, is identified for all values of (; ) and q 2M[f$0g  f$0,
$50, $100, $200g. We will then show that Pq(; ) and FN are identified. Given a listing with mean
and variance of return equal to  and 2, define Pq(; ) to be the probability that funding q dollars
gives higher utility to a lender than funding q0 (q0 6= q) dollars. Formally, Pq(; ) is expressed as
follows:
Pq(; ) =
8><>:
Pr

q  A(q)2   cq   "0  max

0;max
q02M
fq0  A(q0)2   cq0   "0g

for q 2M
Pr(0  max
q02M
fq0  A(q0)2   cq0   "0g) for q = 0
.
Note that Pq(; ) corresponds to the probability that (A; "0) lie in the region defined by the in-
equalities in the expression above. By varying  and , this region changes. Proposition 5 claims
that with enough variation in  and , we can recover the probability that (A; "0) is contained in
an arbitrary set, i.e., identify FA and F"0 .42 In other words, (FA; F"0 ; cq) is identified if Pq(; )
are identified.
Proposition 5 (FA; F"0 ; cq) are identified if (Pq(; ); P0(; )) are identified.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
The next proposition claims that Pq(; ) and FN are both identified.
Proposition 6 Pq(; ) is identified for all q and (; ) on the support of (; ). FN is also
identified.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
The proof of Propositions 5 and 6 are contained in the Online Appendix. Here, we briefly
discuss the intuition for why FN and Pq(; ) are identified. Consider a listing which has yet to be
42Our identification strategy is similar to the one taken in Cohen and Einav (2007).
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fully funded. Let xamt denote the requested loan amount and (, 2) denote the mean return and
variance of this listing if funded at the reserve interest, s. Under the strategy described in section
4.2, lender j bids an amount equal to q if and only if lender j’s risk aversion parameter and the
outside option, (Aj ,"0j), are such that ULj (qZ(s))   "0j  maxfmaxq02M ULj (q0Z(s))   "0j; 0g.
The probability of this event is Pq(; ). Given that a listing is funded if and only if there is a
sufficient number of potential bidders who are willing to fund it, we can express the probability
that a listing is funded as a function of FN and fPq(; )g. Since the probability that a listing
is funded can be identified for all xamt, , and 2, if we assume that FN is invariant to xamt and
(; ), sufficient variation in xamt and (; ) identifies both FN and Pq(; ).43
Our identification relies on the fact that when a lender with (Aj , "0j) visits a listing that is
still not fully funded, the lender submits a bid with amount q if and only if ULj (qZ(s))   "0j 
maxfmaxq02M ULj (q0Z(s))  "0j; 0g, where Z() is evaluated at the return from funding the listing
at s. Note that this lender behavior is consistent with the dominant strategy we described in section
4.2.
6 Estimation
We estimate our model in three steps. First, we estimate the conditional distribution of the contract
interest rate given the reserve rate, f(rjs; x), and the funding probability, Pr(s; x). We estimate
these two functions nonparametrically as f(rjs; x) and Pr(s; x) are both equilibrium objects. The
second step involves estimating the primitives of the model of the borrower, and in the last step,
we estimate the model of the lender. While our discussion of identification in the previous section
focused on nonparametric identification, we place parametric functional forms for some of the
model primitives in our estimation, as we will describe below.
6.1 Estimation of f(rjs; x) and Pr(s; x)
Our estimation proceeds first by estimating f(rjs; x) and Pr(s; x), where x is a vector of observable
listing characteristics such as the credit grade, requested amount, debt-to-income ratio, and home
ownership. We use a (second-order) Hermite series approximation to estimate f(rjs; x), following
Gallant and Nychka (1987). Our estimation of Pr(s; x) is based on a Probit model with flexible
functional forms. The details regarding the estimation are contained in the Online Appendix.
43Assuming that there is rich variation in xamt is a bit problematic because the borrowers cannot request more than
$25; 000 i.e., xamt  25000.
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6.2 Estimation of the Borrower Model
We parameterize the borrower’s period t utility function and outside option with parameters B and
denote them by ut(r; xamt; B) and ('; B). The default cost D(') is normalized as D(') =  '
(see Section 5.1).
In order to estimate B, we maximize the likelihood of repayment and default for each bor-
rower. Note that for any B, our borrower’s repayment model generates a probability distribution
over sequences of repayment and default decisions for each borrower type '. Given that we do not
observe ', we cannot use the probability distribution directly to form a likelihood. Recall, however,
that there is a monotone relationship between ' and s (conditional on x), where this relationship
is implicitly defined by the borrower’s first-order condition (equation (7)). This means that we can
back out the type of the borrower from his choice of s by using the first order condition. Once we
can assign a ' for each borrower, we can then compute the likelihood of repayment and default.
The actual computation of the likelihood proceeds as follows: First, recall that the borrower’s
choice of the reserve rate satisfies the first-order condition;
@ Pr(s; x)
@s
Z
V1(r; '; x; B)f(rjs; x)dr   ('; B)

+Pr(s; x)
Z
V1(r; '; x; B)
@f(rjs; x)
@s
dr = 0.
(10)
Given that we observe the reserve rate chosen by each borrower, this equation can be seen as an
equation in '. In other words, the first-order condition reveals, for each choice of s, the type of
borrower ' who found it optimal to choose s. Since we have estimated Pr(s; x) and f(rjs; x) in
the first step, we can replace these objects with our nonparametric estimatescPr(s; x) and bf(rjs; x).
We can also compute V1(r; '; x; B) for each value of fr; '; xg given B by recursively solving the
borrower’s dynamic problem. This allows us to back out the borrower’s type, b'  b'(s; x; B), for
each borrower. Note that Proposition 1 shows that the right-hand side of equation (10) is monotonic
in ', guaranteeing a unique solution given s and x (for unpooled types).44
The second step of our procedure is to compute the likelihood for a given sequence of repay-
ment decisions for each borrower i, using b'i = b'(si; xi; B). Borrower i’s default probability at
44In practice, there are a few borrowers (less than 10% of the sample) for whom we could not solve for b'(s; x; B)
even when s < 36%. This would happen if the single-crossing condition is not satisfied for a given (s,x), i.e., f(rjx; s)
does not satisfy FOSD or Pr(s; x) is not increasing at (s,x).
In principle, Mailath (1987) gives conditions under which a separating equilibrium exists (in particular, these condi-
tions imply that the single crossing property for the borrowers is satisfied for equation (10)). We checked whether the
conditions in Mailath (1987) are satisfied at the estimated parameters: By-and-large, they seem to be. But for some
values of x, the condition fails, and as a result, we cannot solve for b'(s; x; B) for some borrowers. When we fail to
solve for b', we replace b' with default values. We tried two different default values and the results seem to be pretty
stable. The results from the different specifications are available on request.
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period t is
Pr(default at t; B) =
Z
1 f b'i  ut(ri; xi;amt; B) + dt + "it + Vt+1(ri; b'i)g dF"jx, (11)
and the probability of paying back at period t is 1   Pr(default at t; B). Let it be an indicator
variable that is equal to 1 if borrower i defaults at period t, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, the likelihood is written as
L(B) =
NLY
i=1
"
TiY
t=1
Pr(default at t; B)it  Pr(repay at t; B)(1 it)
#
; (12)
whereNL is the number of loans, fitg, is the sequence of repayment decisions, and Ti  maxf1+PT
=1 i ; 36g, i.e., the number of periods until default or 36 periods, whichever is smaller. We
obtain our parameter estimates by maximizing the likelihood function.45
6.3 Estimation of the Lender Model
The last part of the estimation considers the model of the lender’s bidding behavior. In particular,
we discuss how to estimate the distribution of the number of potential bidders, FN(; L), the dis-
tribution of the lender’s risk attitude, FA(; L), the distribution of the opportunity cost of lending,
F"0(; L), and the lender’s cost of bidding, cq.
We use a (simulated) method of moments by matching the conditional funding probability and
the number of bids. First, let fdi be a dummy variable which equals 1 if listing i is funded, and
0 otherwise. Then 1
I
PI
i=1 fdi gives the (empirical) probability that a listing is funded, where I
is the number of observations. Likewise, let fdi(L) ( fd(xi; si; L)) denote a random dummy
variable which equals 1 if listing i is funded and 0 otherwise, given listing characteristic xi, reserve
interest si, and parameter L. As we will explain below, fd(xi; si; L) can be expressed as
fd(xi; si; L) = 1
(
NX
j=1
qj  xi;amt
)
and (13)
qj = arg max
qj2M[f0g

1fqj 6= 0g
 
ULj (qjZ(s))  "0j
	
,
whereN is the (random) number of potential lenders, ULj (qjZ(s)) is the utility of lending qj dollars
45Up to now, our discussion focused on the case when there is no pooling among the borrowers. Note that even when
there is (partial) pooling, we can obtain the same likelihood for the types that are not being pooled. For estimating the
parameters of the borrowers when there is pooling, we proceed by using just the subsample of borrowers who are not
pooled. While this may not be the most efficient way of estimation, our estimates of the parameters are still consistent
for all of the borrower primitives except for F'jX , for which we will not have a point estimate.
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at interest rate s (defined in expression (8)), and 1E is an indicator function that equals one if event
E is true. Taking this expression as given for now, our objective function minimizes the difference
between the sample moments and the model expectation:
1
I
IX
i=1
fdi   E[fdi(L)].
We now explain why fdi(L) can be expressed as (13). Suppose that there are N potential
lenders and their risk attitude and outside option are (Aj)Nj=1 and ("0j)Nj=1. When the loan is not
fully funded yet, the optimal choice is given by the second equation in expression (13), where
ULj (qjZ()) is evaluated at the reserve interest rate s. Now consider the right hand side of the first
equation of (13). xi;amt is the loan amount requested by borrower j, and
PN
j=1 q

j is just the sum of
the lenders’ bid amount. Assuming that the lenders play the strategy we described in section 4.2, a
loan is funded if and only if
PN
j=1 q

j  xi;amt.
In addition to the funding probability, we also match two moments. The first is the number of
lenders, in particular, the number of lenders who bid an amount q 2 f50; 100; 200g to unfunded
listings. The second is the fraction of listings that receive no bids. These objects can be expressed
as functions of the primitives as long as lenders play the strategy we described in section 4.2.
Note that the set of moments that we use in the estimation does not use the full implications
of the strategy we defined in section 4.2. For example, we do not use information concerning the
realization of the actual contract interest rate or the number of lenders who bid an amount equal to
q conditional on the listing being funded. This is because these objects are quite sensitive to the
particular dominant strategy described in section 4.2. If lenders are playing other strategies (say,
because revising their bid is costly), the distribution over the contract interest rate could be quite
different depending on how we specify the timing of lender arrival. Finally, we have suppressed the
conditioning variables in our exposition, but we construct moment conditions for each conditioning
variable.46
7 Results
The exact specification we use to estimate the model of the borrower is as follows: First, we set
the period utility function as ut(rj; B) =  r  xamt + t, where ftg (t 2 f1; 2; :::; 35g) are time
dummies.47 D(') is normalized to ' and the outside option (') is specified as a linear function
46For our first two moments (fdi and 1ffdi = 0gNi;q), we compute the moments for each credit grade, each
quantile of the debt-to-income ratio and each quantile of the amount requested. For our last moment (nbi), we just
compute one moment for each credit grade. We then sum the moment conditions for each credit grade.
47In practice, we estimate 11 time dummies for each credit grade by imposing t = t+1 = t+2 for t = 3N + 1
(N 2 f0; :::; 11g) and normalizing one of them.
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Amount Quantile Type Quantile AA A B C
25% 10.683 7.437 2.966 3.196
25% 50% 10.872 7.635 3.365 3.479
75% 10.966 8.735 3.867 4.012
25% 9.999 7.085 2.944 3.041
50% 50% 10.302 7.229 3.207 3.424
75% 10.595 8.013 3.726 4.031
25% 7.984 5.685 2.755 3.099
75% 50% 8.196 5.947 2.923 3.463
75% 8.427 6.406 3.454 3.977
25% 7.890 6.118 2.753 3.007
All 50% 9.756 7.199 3.224 3.404
75% 10.683 7.785 3.760 3.947
Table 7: Quantiles of the Borrower’s Type Distribution: This table reports the estimated quartiles of the default cost
of the borrower, ', by credit grade and by requested amount. The unit is $1,000.
with a credit grade specific slope as xgr'. The key primitive of the borrower’s model, the type
of each borrower, is recovered nonparametrically for each borrower. Lastly, F" is specified to be
a Type I extremum value distribution with standard error equal to " and the discount factor, , is
set to 0:951=12.
As for the lenders’ side, we estimated the distribution of potential lenders, FN , the distribution
of lender’s risk attitude, FAj , the distribution of the outside option and forecasting error, F"0j ,
and the costs of bidding for each amount choice, fc50; c100; c200g. In our estimation, we specified
FN to follow a log normal distribution with parameters N and 2N . Moreover, we specified the
distribution of both the risk attitude, FAj , and the outside option, F"0 , to be Normally distributed
with N(A; 2A) and N("0; ; 2"0). The mean of the distribution of F"0j is allowed to depend on
the calendar month,  , to capture changes in the lender’s outside option or beliefs due to factors
such as macro shocks. Given that one of fc50, c100, c200, "0;g can be normalized to zero, we set
c50 = 0.
We report the estimation results in Table 7 and Table 8. In Table 7, we report the distribution
of the default cost of the borrower ('), by credit grade and requested amount. Table 8 report the
parameter estimates of the model.
Table 7 reports the quantiles of borrower type (') by credit grade and by requested amount in
units of $1; 000. Recall that one interpretation of ' is the borrower’s default cost, with good types
having high default cost (and hence less likely to default) and bad types having low default cost
(and hence more likely to default). We find that the median default cost (across all requested loan
amount) are estimated to be around $9; 800 for credit grade AA, $7; 200 for credit grade A, $3; 200
for credit grade B and $3; 400 for credit grade C (second to last to row).48 We find that borrowers
with credit grades AA and A have much higher default cost compared to borrowers with credit
48For borrowers who posted a reserve rate equal to 36%, we do not have a point estimate of their types. The
quantiles are not affected by this however.
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Borrower Lender Estimates by Grade
Parameter Estimates Parameter AA A B C
" 6:0096 N 4:5848 3:5513 4:3386 2:9504
(0:2095) (0:0635) (0:1569) (0:2761) (0:0733)
AA 3:0965 N 0:7213 1:3940 1:1132 1:4640
(0:0827) (0:0442) (0:0984) (0:3151) (0:0448)
A 4:3398 A 2:24 10 2 1:91 10 2 3:67 10 2 3:46 10 2
(0:1384) (1:64 10 3) (1:72 10 3) (8:22 10 3) (1:79 10 3)
B 9:4551 A 2:22 10 2 2:00 10 2 1:75 10 2 1:58 10 2
(0:3477) (9:36 10 4) (6:58 10 4) (3:29 10 3) (4:56 10 4)
C 8:8111 "0  14:8775  13:2908  9:6035  1:4651
(0:3551) (0:8411) (0:7640) (1:8669) (0:0385)
"0 86:4102 62:7313 32:1786 88:4056
(10:2508) (4:0462) (4:4980) (2:6275)
c100  1:6206  1:7003  0:5006 0:5668
(0:3704) (0:1413) (0:0755) (0:0238)
c200  21:9644  27:3998  10:9928  14:8229
(3:1801) (2:8967) (2:7251) (0:5049)
Obs 3; 818 1; 420 1; 850 3; 068 5; 203
Table 8: Parameter Estimates of the Borrower’s and Lender’s Model. We report the parameter estimates of the
borrower’s model in the first column of this table and the estimation results of the lender’s model in the rest. Time
dummies are included in the estimation of both the borrower’s and lender’s model, but we omit the estimates from the
table. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrap (150 times) and they are reported in parentheses. Borrower’s model is
scaled in $1,000, and the lender’s model is scaled in $1.
grades B or C. This seems natural given that we expect borrowers with good credit grades to have
higher default cost. While we find it somewhat surprising that borrowers with credit grade C have
slightly higher default cost than borrowers with credit grade B, this probably reflects the fact that
borrowers of these two credit grades are not that different – as we reported in Table 3, the average
default probability of borrowers in these two credit grades were only about 1% apart.
Another general pattern that can be seen from Table 7 is that borrowers who request a large
amount generally have lower values of '. For example, the median AA borrower with a requested
loan amount at the 75% quantile has a default cost equal to about $8; 200 – which is more than
$2; 000 lower than the default cost of the median AA borrower with a requested amount at the
25% quantile. Note that conditioning on the requested amount tightens the distribution of ' sig-
nificantly in credit grades AA and A, but less so for B and C. For example, the unconditional
interquartile range of credit grade AA is about 2:8 whereas the conditional interquartile range at
the median requested amount is less than 0:6. For credit grade C, the unconditional and the condi-
tional interquartile range are about the same. These results imply that the requested amount has an
important signaling value for credit grades AA and A, but not so much for credit grades B and C.
In the first two columns of 8 we report the parameter estimates of the borrowers’ model. The
rest of Table 8 presents the estimation results of the lenders’ model. Recall that xgr is a parameter
that measures the relationship between the default cost of the borrower (') and the utility of the
outside option (xgr'). Our estimates of xgr indicate that it is smaller for high credit grades
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(AA = 3:1 and A = 4:3) and becomes larger for low credit grades (B = 9:5 and C = 8:8).
Our estimates imply that a $100 increase in the default cost of the borrower translates to a $310
increase in the outside option for credit grades AA, $430 increase for credit grade A, and so on.
The relatively large estimate of xgr that we find for low credit grades compared to high credit
grades may reflect the fact that the marginal increase in the default cost of the borrower for low
credit grades leads to a disproportionate increase in the default probability. A given reduction in
the default cost may translate to more credit at lower credit grades and hence to a higher utility
from the outside option.
Columns 3 through 7 of Table 8 report the parameter estimates for the lenders. We estimated a
log Normal distribution for the number of potential bidders. The parameter estimates reported in
the table (N , N ) translate to a mean number of potential lenders of about 127:1, 92:1, 142:3, and
55:8 for each of the four credit grades. Our estimates of the lenders’ risk aversion parameter (A,
A) range from 1:91  10 2 to 3:67  10 2, which are comparable to the risk aversion estimates
reported in Paravisini, Rappoport and Ravina (2013) who studies a similar setting. They estimate
that the average risk aversion among participants of Lending Club, another P2P lending web site,
is about 3:68  10 2, with a standard deviation of about 2:37  10 2. Our results also lie in that
range of estimates reported in Holt and Laury (2002).
Finally, Table 8 reports our estimate of the mean of "0j ("0), which range from -1:47 to -14:88.
Note that we let "0 vary by month – the estimates in Table 8 correspond to the mean of "0j for
October 2008.49 The estimates of "0 for other months are not reported in the table but they are
quite similar.
Recall that "0j is a term that captures a combination of the lender’s forecasting error and oppor-
tunity cost. Given our specification,  "0j can also be interpreted as lender j’s utility from lending
$50 to a loan that is certain to yield a 0% interest ( =  = 0). The negative estimates of "0 imply
that lenders are, on average, willing to fund such a loan. This suggests that lenders had overly
optimistic beliefs, and that some of this optimism is captured in "0j .
8 Counterfactual Experiment
In our counterfactual experiment, we compare the equilibrium market outcome and welfare under
three alternative market designs – a market with signaling, a market without signaling (i.e., pool-
ing) and a market with no information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. This counter-
factual is interesting because it allows us to empirically quantify the extent to which credit markets
suffer from adverse selection and the extent to which signaling can affect market outcomes. In
49October 2008 is the last month of the sample period.
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Figure 7: The Credit Supply Curve for the Borrower of the Median Type – The thick dotted curve corresponds
to the credit supply curve under no signaling (i.e., pooling). The solid line corresponds to the credit supply curve
under signaling, and the dotted line that lies on top of it corresponds to the credit supply curve under no asymmetric
information. Borrower covariates are set to the median values.
particular, the question of how adverse selection affects credit supply goes back to Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) but few empirical attempts have been made to study the effect.50
In Figure 7, we present the credit supply curves for each of the four credit grades. The horizon-
tal axis in the figure corresponds to the average supply of credit and the vertical axis corresponds
to the interest rate. The scale of the horizontal axis is different for each of the four panels reflect-
ing the fact that the amount of credit supply varies considerably from credit grade to credit grade.
The curves in the figure correspond to the credit supply curve under signaling, no asymmetric
information, and pooling. Below, we explain each in turn.
 Credit supply curve under signaling: The solid curves in Figure 7 correspond to the credit
supply curves under signaling. These supply curves correspond to the average amount of
credit that potential lenders are willing to supply under the actual mechanism used by Pros-
per. The supply curves are drawn for the median (unobserved) borrower type in each credit
grade.51 The reserve interest rate for the median type corresponds to about 11%, 15%, 20%,
22%, for credit grades AA, A, B and C, respectively. The credit supply curves trace the
average amount of credit that potential lenders are willing to supply to the median borrower
type at different interest rates. Note that the supply curves are truncated above at the reserve
interest rates (e.g., 11% for credit grade AA). The borrower does not have access to credit
above the reserve rate in the signaling equilibrium.
 Credit supply curve under no asymmetric information (NAI): The dotted curves that lie
on top of the signaling credit supply curves correspond to the case with NAI. The supply
50We treat FN , the distribution of the number of lenders as exogenous in simulating our counterfactual. We also
take F', the borrower’s type distribution, as exogenous. We acknowledge that these are potential limitations of our
counterfactual experiment.
51We also fix the observable characteristic of the borrwer to xamt = 10; 000, debt-to-income ratio equal to 0:2, and
home ownership variable equal to one.
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curves are again drawn for the median (unobserved) borrower type. The credit supply un-
der NAI are computed under the counterfactual scenario in which the lenders can directly
observe ' (as opposed to learning ' through the reserve rate). Note that under both the
signaling equilibrium and NAI, the lenders have perfect knowledge of borrower types in
equilibrium: The lenders know that they are lending to a borrower of a particular type. Thus,
the credit supply curves under signaling and NAI partly coincide.
The difference between signaling and NAI is that the borrowers do not need to signal their
type by the reserve price under NAI. Hence, they can borrow at rates that are higher than the
reserve rate that they would post under the signaling equilibrium. This means that the credit
supply curve for NAI extends beyond the reserve rate all the way until the point at which the
borrower is indifferent between borrowing and not borrowing. The truncated supply curve
under the signaling equilibrium can be viewed as capturing the cost that borrowers must pay
(i.e., the surplus that has to be burned) in order to differentiate himself from lower types in
the signaling equilibrium.
 Credit supply curve under no signaling (i.e., pooling): The thick dotted curve in each of
the panels represent the credit supply curve under asymmetric information with no signaling
(i.e., pooling). This curve is computed assuming that each borrower can post a secret reserve
price. That is, we let the borrower take out a loan only if the contract interest at the end
of the bid closing period is less than the secret reserve price. Note that under this market
design, it is a dominant strategy for each borrower to submit a secret reserve rate equal to
the interest rate at which the borrower is indifferent between borrowing and not borrowing.52
This market design would induce pooling of types, i.e., at a given interest rate, there would
be a mix of different borrowers who take out the loan, and the lenders have no way of
differentiating among them. The supply curve traces out the average amount of credit that
potential lenders are willing to supply to a pool of borrower types at a given interest rate.
The pool of borrowers correspond to the set of borrowers whose secret reserve price is higher
than the given interest rate.
Figure 7 makes clear the role of adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets. First,
note that the credit supply curve under signaling and under no asymmetric information for grades B
and C are backward bending. This is the result of moral hazard. As borrowers are charged higher
interest rates, the likelihood of default increases. Above a certain interest rate, the marginal in-
crease in revenue from a higher interest rate is overwhelmed by the loss from increased probability
of default. As a result, the supply of credit starts to decrease at a certain point.
52For a more detailed computational procedure for obtaining the credit supply curve under pooling as well as the
supply curve under signaling and under no asymmetric information, see Online Appendix.
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Expected Median
Borrower Lender Total Borrower Lender Total
Signaling 466.4 1642.6 2109.0 423.3 1645.2 2068.5
AA Pooling 613.2 2531.4 3144.6 567.7 2587.1 3154.9
Symmetric 675.7 2801.6 3477.2 633.0 2885.6 3518.6
Signaling 143.0 1470.4 1613.4 143.1 1488.6 1631.7
A Pooling 142.7 1491.7 1634.4 142.4 1497.5 1639.9
Symmetric 143.3 1481.5 1624.8 143.1 1488.6 1631.7
Signaling 396.7 573.5 970.2 380.4 577.9 958.3
B Pooling 343.1 477.6 820.7 327.7 478.1 805.7
Symmetric 398.4 579.8 978.2 382.2 581.7 963.9
Signaling 417.9 510.0 927.9 434.5 508.5 943.0
C Pooling 374.7 445.3 820.0 392.1 446.1 838.2
Symmetric 425.5 518.7 944.2 446.7 517.3 964.0
Table 9: Expected Surplus for Different Market Designs by Credit Grade: The first three columns correspond to the
expected surplus of the borrwer, the lender and the sum of the two. The last three columns correspond to the expected
surplus genrated from loans to the median borrower.
On the other hand, the shape of the supply curves under pooling reflects both moral hazard
and adverse selection. Both adverse selection and moral hazard combine to suppress the supply
of credit at higher interest rates. The borrowers who are willing to take out a loan at high interest
rates tend to be of low types who are likely to default to begin with. Moreover, the borrowers
that take out the loan are likely to default because of high interest. This is the reason why the
supply curves for pooling start to bend backwards sooner (i.e., at lower interest rates) than the
supply curves under signaling and under no asymmetric information. Depending on the shape of
the credit demand curve there could be credit rationing, as demonstrated by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981).
Figure 7 is also informative about the severity of adverse selection for different credit grades.
There are substantial differences between the credit supply under pooling and the supply curve
under no asymmetric information for grades B and C. This is indicative that adverse selection in
these credit categories is relatively more severe. This is also broadly consistent with the findings in
Iyer et. al. (2010) where they find that conditional on the credit grade, the borrowers’ credit score
had a statistically significant effect on the default rate in grade C, but not in better credit grades.
Finally, we examine the welfare implications of signaling and information asymmetry. In Table
9, we report the surplus of the lenders and the borrowers per listing for each of the three different
market designs we consider. The surplus of a borrower with type ' is the product of the probability
of being funded (Pr(funded)) and the surplus conditional on borrowing (Er[V1(r; ')   (')]),
where the expectation is over the contract interest rate. The surplus of lender j is Er[ULj (r)], if a
loan is funded and 0, otherwise. We compute the average and the median surplus by simulating
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the model using the estimates we obtained from our structural model. Details of the computation
are discussed in the Online Appendix. Listing characteristics such as the amount, debt-to-income
ratio, and home ownership are set to their median values, as before.
In the first three columns, we report the expected surplus averaged over the borrower’s type
distribution. First, consider the welfare of the borrowers reported in the first column. Comparing
the borrower welfare under pooling and under no asymmetric information, we find that the welfare
loss from information asymmetry is relatively modest in credit grade A ($142:7 under pooling
and $143:3 under no asymmetric information) while the welfare loss is relatively more severe
in credit grades AA, B and C. Comparing these numbers to borrower welfare under signaling,
we find that welfare improves relative to pooling in all credit grades except for credit grade AA.
In particular, for credit grades B and C, signaling restores most of the welfare loss caused by
adverse selection. For credit grade AA, the borrower welfare under pooling is higher than the
borrower welfare under signaling. This happens because the surplus that must be burned (i.e., the
transactions that must be foregone by submitting a lower reserve interest rate under signaling) in
order to maintain a separating equilibrium is sufficiently costly. This off-sets any benefits gained
by reducing information asymmetry between the lenders and the borrowers. Note that in general,
it is not possible to Pareto-rank equilibrium under pooling and signaling.
Second, consider the welfare of the lenders reported in the second column. Comparing the
welfare of the lenders under pooling and under no asymmetric information, we find that welfare
decreases considerably under pooling in all credit grades except for credit grade A, where welfare
of the lenders is slightly higher under pooling.53 Similar to what we found for the case of bor-
rowers, we find that signaling improves welfare in credit grades B and C, but not in credit grade
AA (and A). Again, the reason for this is that for credit grade AA, there is a net decrease in the
listings that are funded as a result of low reserve rates. This is in contrast to credit grades B and C
where the increased credit supply from reducing information asymmetry outweighs the reduction
in transactions that result from lower reserve interest rates.
The third column of Table 9 is informative about the cost of adverse selection, as well as the
extent to which welfare can be restored through signaling. Comparing the total surplus under
pooling and no asymmetric information, we find that the cost of adverse selection can be quite
large, with a 16% ($157:5) decrease in total surplus for credit grade B and a 13% ($124:2) decrease
in total surplus for credit grade C. We also find that in some instances, signaling can restore a large
fraction of the potential welfare loss from adverse selection, with 95% and 87% of the welfare loss
avoided through signaling in credit grades B and C.
53Given that borrowers have limited liability, welfare is not necessarily maximized under no informational asym-
metry. More borrowers may obtain credit under pooling than under no information asymmetry and total welfare may
be lower under the latter setting than under the former.
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Figure 8: The Credit Supply Curve for the Borrower of the Median Type. See Figure 7 for description.
Lastly, we report the expected surplus of the borrowers and lenders given a listing posted by
the median borrower type in columns four through six. The overall patterns are similar to those of
the mean reported in the first three columns.
9 Robustness
An important assumption that we have made all along is that the lenders’ beliefs over the return
from lending money deviate from rational expectations in very limited ways. In particular, we
assumed that the lender’s risk attitude (Aj) and "0j are independent. This assumption implies that
the lenders’ beliefs over the variance of return to conincide with the realized variance.
In order to check the robustness of our results to this assumption, we estimated an alternative
specification with more structure on the lenders’ beliefs. In particular, we estimated a model where
the beliefs of the lenders are given by
 = RE + 0 + 1S&P
2 = 2RE  exp(12S&P ),
where RE and 2RE are the mean and variance of the realized loan return and S&P and 2S&P
are the weekly mean and the volatility index of the S&P 500 and 0, 1 and 1 are parameters
to be estimated. The mean of "0j is set to zero, instead. Our estimates (full results are reported
in the Online Appendix) of 1 and v1 are quite close to zero, implying that including the stock
market performance does not improve much relative to our baseline results. Figure 8 plots the
counterfactual credit supply curve from this specification. The supply curves are qualitatively
similar to the baseline results in Figure 7.
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10 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how signaling can restore some of the inefficiencies arising from adverse se-
lection using data from an online peer-to-peer lending market, Prosper.com. We first provide some
evidence showing that the reserve interest rate posted by potential borrowers work as a signaling
device. Based on this evidence, we then develop and estimate a structural model of borrowers and
lenders. In our counterfactual, we compare the credit supply curve and welfare under three dif-
ferent market designs: a market with signaling, a market without signaling, and a market with no
asymmetric information. We find that in one of the credit grades, signaling exacerbates the welfare
cost of adverse selection, but we also find that signaling can restore much of the welfare losses that
result from adverse selection in other credit grades.
Our paper is the first structural analysis of signaling in industrial organization to the best of our
knowledge, and it is also the first attempt at estimating the credit supply curve, as far as we are
aware. We also believe that the methods developed in the paper can be applied to other settings in
which signaling is important (e.g., auctions and reservation price). For future research, we think
that it is important to study other types of credit markets in order to understand more fully the costs
of adverse selection and the benefits of signaling.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We provide a proof of Proposition 1. We do so by first proving the following lemma.
Lemma 1 @
@'
V1(r; ') is non-increasing in r.
Proof. The proof is by induction. We first show that @
@r@'
VT (r; ')  0, @@rVT (r; ')  0, and
D0(')   @
@'
VT (r; ') < 0. We then show that if @@r@'V (r; ')  0 and D0(')  @@'V (r; ') < 0
for some   T , then the same conditions hold for    1. First, for t = T ,
@
@'
VT (r; ') =
@
@'
Z
maxfuT (r) + "T ; D(')gdF"T ("T ) = D0(') PrT (r; ') ,
where PrT (r; ') = Pr(uT (r) + "T < D(')). It is easy to see that D0(')  @@'VT (r; ') <
 @
@'
VT (r; ') < 0 because D0(') < 0, by assumption and Pr (uT (r) + "T < D(')) 2 (0; 1). Also,
note that @
@r
uT (r) < 0 implies @@r Pr (uT (r) + "T < D(')) > 0, which means that
@
@r@'
VT (r; ') 
0. It is also easy to see that @
@r
VT (r; ') < 0.
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Now, assume @
@r@'
Vt+1(r; ')  0, @@rVt+1(r; ')  0, and D0(')   @@'Vt+1(r; ') < 0 for some
t. Then,
@
@'
Vt(r; ') =
@
@'
Z
maxfut(r) + "t + Vt+1(r; '); D(')gdF"t("t)
=
@
@'
Vt+1(r; ')(1  Prt (r; ')) +D0(') Prt (r; ')  D0('),
where Prt (r; ') = Pr(ut(r) + "t + Vt+1(r; ') < D(')). The last inequality holds since
@
@'
Vt+1(r; ')  D0('). Again, it is easy to see @@'Vt(r; ') < 0, and @@rVt(r; ')  0. To see
that @
@r@'
Vt(r; ')  0, note that
@
@r@'
Vt(r; ') =
@
@r

@
@'
Vt+1(r; ')(1  Prt (r; ')) +D0(') Prt (r; ')

=
@2
@r@'
Vt+1(r; ')(1  Prt (r; ')) + @
@r
Prt (r; ') (D0(')  @
@'
Vt+1(r; '))  0.
By induction we conclude that @
@r@'
V1(r; ')  0.
Proposition 1 If @
@s
Pr(s) > 0 and F (rjs) FOSD F (rjs0) for s0 > s, then we have SCP, i.e.,
@2
@s@'
V0(s; ') =
@2
@s@'

Pr(s)
Z
V1(r; ')f(rjs)dr + (1  Pr(s))(')

< 0.
Proof. First, let us consider the second term. Note that @2
@s@'
(1 Pr(s))(') =  Pr0(s)0(') <
0. This is because Pr0(s) > 0 and 0(') > 0 by assumption. Second, we consider the first term.
Note that for s0 < s1, F (rjs1) first-order stochastically dominates F (rjs0). Hence if @@'V1(r; ')
is non-increasing in r, then
R
@
@'
V1(r; ')dF (rjs0) 
R
@
@'
V1(r; ')dF (rjs1) for any s0 and s1 s.t.
s0 < s1. This implies that @@s@' Pr(s)
R
V1(r; ')dF (rjs)  0. Thus, we complete the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that the lender bids an interest rate, rj , that is higher than r0 (the interest rate at which the
lender is indifferent between lending and not lending). If the final contract interest r turns out to
be above rj , then the lender funds a loan at r regardless of whether she bid r0 or rj . If the contract
interest r turns out to be less than r0, then the lender does not get to fund the loan, regardless of
whether she bid r0 or rj . The only circumstance under which bidding rj or r0 makes a difference
is when the final contract interest rate is between r0 and rj . In this case, the lender will be able
to lend at a rate equal to r if she bids r0, while she will not be able to lend if she bids rj . Since
lending at r 2 [r0; rj] gives the lender higher utility than not funding the loan, setting the rate equal
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to r0 weakly dominates setting it to rj . Likewise, it is also easily shown that submitting a bid that
is lower than r0 is weakly dominated by bidding r0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
In this Appendix, we provide a proof of identification of F'jX , F"jX , and ('). We first note that
we can normalize one of the constants in ut without loss of generality: Hence we set dT = 0.54
Also, we can normalize the location of F'jX at one point: Hence, we set F 1'jX() = 0 for some
 2 (0; 1) and X.55 In what follows, we consider the case when there is no pooling. The Online
Appendix contains the proof for the case when there is partial pooling.
Consider the repayment decision of the borrower with F 1'jX()(= 0) at period t = T . The
borrower’s problem is as follows:(
repay: if   (r  xamt) + "T   F 1'jX() = 0
default: otherwise,
where xamt is an element of X. This is simply a binary threshold-crossing model; hence using
variation in r, we can nonparametrically identify the conditional distribution of "T given X, i.e.,
F"jX . Once F"jX is identified, we can identify F 1'jX() for all  given X by conditioning
the sample on the -quantile of s given X (i.e., samples with s = F 1sjX()).56 This is because
F 1'jX() is just a constant term in the binary threshold-crossing model where the distribution of
"T given X has already been identified.
Now consider the t = T   1 period problem with X = X:(
repay: if   (r  xamt) + dT 1 + VT (r; F 1'jX()) + "T 1   F 1'jX()
default: otherwise,
where VT (r; F 1'jX()) and F
 1
'jX() have already identified. Similarly as before, we can nonpara-
metrically identify the distribution of ("T 1 + dT 1) and the value of  using variation in r, given
that this is a simple binary threshold crossing model. It should be clear that f"t+dtgtT 2 can also
be identified by looking at the borrower’s period t problem and the associated default probability.
Now, we discuss how to identify ('). Rearranging the borrower’s FOC in equation (7) evalu-
54If we set ~dt = dt +  (8t) ~"t = "t    (8t), it will be observationally equivalent to dt, F"jX .
55Given that D(') =  ', if we set ~"t = "t +  (8t), ~F'jX(h) = F'jX(h + ), ~dT = dT , ~dt = dt    (t 2
f1; :::; T  1g) and ~(') = (') +, it will be observationally equivalent to "t, dt, F'jX , and . This normalization
is convenient for proving identification, but we use an equivalent normalization (i.e., Med["tjX] = const:) for our
estimation.
56Here, we are using the fact that ' ? "jX.
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ated at X = X and solving for ('), we obtain
(') =
Z
V1(r; ';X
)f(rjs;X)dr + Pr(s;X
)
@
@s
Pr(s;X)
Z
V1(r; ';X
)
@
@s
f(rjs;X)dr; (2)
where we have made the dependence on X explicit. Note that all the terms on the right hand side
are identified. First, V1 is identified given that F"jX , F'jX , and  have already been identified.
Also, we know that borrowers of type' submit a reserve rate equal to s(';X) = F 1sjX(F'jX(')).
Then evaluating Pr(s;X) and f(rjs;X) – which are both directly observed in the data – at
s(';X), we can identify the right-hand side of the equation. Hence the previous equation identi-
fies (').
Lastly, we show that F'jX and F"jX are identified for any X . To see that F'jX and F"jX are
identified for any X , note that it is enough to identify F'jX(0) – if F'jX(0) is identified, we can
follow the same steps as above to identify F'jX and F"jX . In order to see that F'jX(0) is identified,
consider a given profile, (F "jX ; F 'jX ; 
; dt ). Note that the set of profiles that are observation-
ally equivalent to (F "jX ; F 'jX ; 
; dt ) are given by f(F"jX ; F'jX ; ; dt) : F"jX(h) = F "jX(h   ),
F'jX(h) = F 'jX(h + ), dT = d

T , dt = d

t    (t < T ), (') = (') + g. Given that we
have already identified ('), we can identify F'jX(0). This concludes the proof of identification
when there is no pooling. In the Online Appendix we also discuss the case when there is pooling
at s = 36%.
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